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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis I examine tender offers and the determinants which significantly affect their 
outcome. The focus is on revealing the determinants which help acquirers anticipate the outcome 
of the offer already before the offer is announced. First, I attempt to find the deal specific 
determinants which most significantly affect the outcome of tender offers. The second objective 
of this paper is to measure the country-level differences in investor protection and the effects of 
these differences to the outcome of the offer. In addition, I try to alleviate the ambiguity relating 
to the effect of the tender offer premium offered to the shareholders by adding a variable whether 
the offer price exceeds the target 52-week high price. I also study the determinants in special 
situations such as hostile and competed offers.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A sample of 3783 tender offers from 38 countries was gathered from SDC Platinum. The sample 
included offers announced and completed during the time period spanning from 1986 to 2010. 
Supplementary stock price data was collected from Thomson ONE Banker. The investor 
protection measures, the anti-director rights index used as a proxy for shareholder protection and 
the creditor rights index are from the papers by Spamann (2010) and Djankov et al. (2007), 
respectively. The measures for law enforcement and the level of corruption are obtained from 
World Bank databases. Logistic regression method was used to analyze the data.  
 
RESULTS 
Shareholder protection is found to have no effect on the outcome of the offer which adds to the 
findings of Spamann (2010). High level of creditor rights in the target country decreases the 
probability of success. Hostile attitude and competition among bidders are found to be the most 
significant determinants of tender offer success. Both have a negative effect on the outcome. I 
find the one week offer premium to have a positive impact of the outcome of a tender offer. The 
effect fades when the variable for offer price exceeding the target 52-week high is added. This 
confirms that after exceeding a certain level the significance of the premium is low. Contrary to 
previous findings toeholds are found to have a significant impact only in hostile offers.  
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän työn tarkoituksena on tutkia yrityskauppojen, joiden tekotapa on julkinen ostotarjous, 
onnistumistodennäköisyyttä, ja selvittää onnistumistodennäköisyyteen vaikuttavia seikkoja. 
Tutkin ensin kauppakohtaisia seikkoja jotka voivat vaikuttaa tarjouksen onnistumiseen, ja yritän 
selvittää aiemmassa tutkimuksessa mielipiteitä jakaneen ostohinnan vaikutusta ostotarjouksen 
onnistumistodennäköisyyteen lisäämällä sijoittajapsykologiaan liittyvän muuttujan, joka vertaa 
ostohintaa kohteen viimeisimpien 52 viikon korkeimpaan osakekurssiin. Tutkin myös 
erikoistapauksia kuten vihamielisiä sekä kilpailtuja julkisia ostotarjouksia. Työn toinen tavoite on 
selvittää sijoittajasuojan tason vaihtelun vaikutusta julkisiin ostotarjouksiin joissa tarjoaja ja 
ostokohde sijaitsevat eri maissa. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Tutkimuksessa käytetty otos käsittää 3783 julkista ostotarjousta 38 eri maasta. Tarjoukset ovat 
tehty, ja niiden lopputulos on ilmoitettu vuosien 1986 ja 2010 välisenä aikana. Ostotarjouksia 
käsittelevä aineisto on kerätty SDC Platinum ja Thomson ONE Banker –tietokannoista. 
Sijoittajien suojaa kuvaava indeksi on otettu Spamann:nin (2010) tutkimuksesta, kun taas 
velkojien suojaa kuvaavan indeksin ovat julkaisseet Djankov et al. (2007). Muut sijoittajasuojaan 
liittyvät, lakien noudattamista sekä korruption tasoa mittaavat indeksit ovat Maailmanpankin 
tietokannoista. Aineiston analysointi tapahtui logistisen regressionanalyysin avulla.   
 
TULOKSET 
Julkisen ostotarjouksen onnistumiseen vaikuttavat vahvimmin kohteen johdon vihamielinen 
suhtautuminen tarjoukseen sekä kilpailu tarjoajien kesken. Molempien vaikutus onnistumiseen on 
negatiivinen. Myös ostohinta vaikuttaa onnistumiseen positiivisesti, mutta sen vaikutus pienenee, 
kun lisään kohteen 52 viikon korkeimman osakekurssin hinnan viitetasoksi. Vastoin edellisiä 
tutkimustuloksia havaitsen, että tarjoajan omistus kohteessa ennen tarjouksen tekemistä vaikuttaa 
positiivisesti vain vihamielisissä tarjouksissa. Yli rajojen ulottovissa kaupoissa vain velkojien 
suoja vaikuttaa onnistumistodennäköisyyteen merkittävästi. Korkeampi velkojien suojan taso 
vaikuttaa kaupan onnistumiseen negatiivisesti.       
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Acquisitions are an important instrument for companies to expand their product offering, 
geographic coverage and to obtain the necessary resources to remain competitive. Because of 
these reasons acquisitions have been a subject heavily studied by finance scholars. The causes of 
acquisitions and the following operational and stock market performance of the acquirer and the 
target are subjects which have been exhaustively documented in the past research. The 
motivation for corporate acquisitions has been found to range from the creation of operational 
synergies to managerial hubris and empire-building. 
When we enter the domain of corporate acquisitions it can be crudely divided to mergers, which 
can be described as a combination of two friendly parties and tender offers, which are public 
offers, made directly to target shareholders to tender their shares to the bidder for a certain offer 
price. The beauty of a tender offer lies in the feature that target management can be bypassed 
with a public offer, so the bidder can acquire the target even in a situation where the target 
management opposes the bid. As no private negotiations take place the bidder cannot extract any 
knowledge from the target during the negotiations. Because of this the determinants affecting the 
outcome of a tender offer are an important but a challenging research subject as the outcome of 
the offer is affected by various different details of the offer. 
Probably the most famous study conducted about tender offers is the one made by Bradley, Desai 
and Kim (1988) who study the effects of tender offer announcements to the stock prices of the 
target and the bidder. They confirm the hypothesis that corporate acquisitions create positive 
synergies which increase the value of the target and the bidder. They measure positive combined 
abnormal stock returns of 7.4% for the target and the bidder at the announcement of the tender 
offer. Consequently, failing in a tender offer has its effects on the bidder as well as for the target. 
Flanagan et al. (1998), report that 23% of all tender offers between 1977 and 1988 were 
unsuccessful. Bradley et al. (1983) confirm that on average the stockholders of unsuccessful 
bidding firms suffer a significant wealth loss, which is related to the loss in a control contest to a 
rival. The negative wealth effect is caused by the competitive disadvantage position at the 
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product market resulting from the failed acquisition. Ruback (1988) adds that a failed bid also 
reflects negatively in the future returns of the target as well.   
As the potential positive and negative effects of tender offers are well-defined the next step is to 
determine how a bidder can maximize the probability of success when making a tender offer of a 
company. The factors or determinants affecting the outcome of a tender offer are a subject which 
has been less studied than, for example the announcement effects, or the reasons behind those 
effects. The reason probably is that the predicting tender offer outcomes is a complicated matter 
as the scale of potential of factors affecting the outcome is quite large. 
The most influential empirical papers taking multiple determinants into consideration about 
tender offer success are the ones written by Walkling (1985) and Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981). 
Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) build a theoretical model on the subject. One of the latest papers is 
the one written by Flanagan et al. (1998). 
Out of all the determinants affecting the outcome of a tender offer the attitude of the target 
management has been found to be the most influential one. All the previously mentioned studies 
have confirmed that negative, hostile target management reaction to the tender offer 
announcement has a significant negative impact on the outcome of the offer. Although the offer 
is made directly to the shareholders the opinion of the management is important as they can use 
all kinds of takeover defenses to deter the bid (Baron, 1983). The reason for hostility can be 
strategic, hostility is used as a negotiation tactic to drive the offer price upwards or it can occur 
because of managerial entrenchment (Schwert, 2000). 
The role of the premium offered to target shareholders has been the most controversial question 
so far. Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) and older studies have found the offer premium to be an 
insignificant determinant of the offer success. Conversely, Walkling (1985) presents empirical 
results that the size of the offer premium has a significant positive effect on the outcome of the 
offer. He reasons that the previous results are due to the misspecification of the premium due to 
rumors and information leakages affecting the target stock price already before making the SEC 
filing. The theoretical model of Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) clearly indicates that the probability 
of success increases linearly with the size of the premium offered. But to make the matter even 
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more ambiguous, Flanagan et al. (1998) find the size of the premium insignificant in their 
empirical paper.  
One interesting theory which could help in explaining the role played by the tender offer 
premium is presented by Baker et al. (2009). They tie the tender offer price to the target 52-week 
high price during the year prior the offer and use the high price as a psychological reference point 
(Kahneman, 1992). They find that an offer exceeding this reference point is more likely to 
succeed than an offer where the premium offered is lower than the reference point price. This 
shows that anchoring the premium to a certain level might help succeeding in an offer more than 
the absolute level of the premium offered. 
Another determinant which has been documented to have a positive effect on the outcome of the 
offer is the toehold held by the bidder (Walkling, 1985; Hirsleifer and Titman, 1990; Flanagan et 
al., 1998). Toehold represents the percentage of target shares held by the bidder before the 
announcement of the tender offer. The empirical results of the effect of the toehold are very clear, 
but still using a toehold is rare in non-hostile acquisitions (Betton et al., 2009). 
In addition to the above mentioned determinants there are other less frequently studied 
determinants, such as competition among bidders and the method of payment used, to mention a 
few, which have been found to have an effect on the outcome of the offer, but the effects have not 
been as clear as with the previously mentioned ones. That combined with the uncertainty related 
to the effects of certain determinants such as the offer premium proves that there is still ground to 
cover in the research related to the success of tender offers.           
1.2 Objective and Contribution 
In this thesis I examine tender offers taking place between 1986 and 2010, and the determinants 
which significantly affect their outcome. The focus is on revealing the determinants which help 
acquirers anticipate the outcome of the offer already before the offer is announced. 
First, I try to find the significant determinants affecting the outcome of the tender offer with a 
global sample of 3873 tender offers from 38 countries consisting both domestic and cross-border 
offers. The second objective of this paper is to measure the country-level differences in investor 
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protection and the effects of these differences to the outcome of the offer. This is done with a 
smaller sample consisting of only cross-border tender offers. 
The research questions of this thesis are the following:  
1. What are the determinants affecting the outcome of a tender offer? 
2. How does the level of investor protection affect the outcome of cross-
border tender offers? 
The first research question relates to the theoretical paper by Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) and to 
the empirical research conducted by Walkling (1985) and Flanagan et al. (1998). I try to find the 
significant determinants affecting the outcome of the offer which have been proven to have an 
impact on the outcome of the offer. My goal is to find the most significant factors explaining the 
outcome from the determinants used in the previous literature. To evaluate the significance of the 
offer premium in a more versatile manner I include the comparison of the offer price to the 52-
week target high price to the analysis as Baker et al. (2009) did.  
In order to reveal more information about the effects of hostility and competition to the outcome 
of the offer I divide the sample according the attitude of the target management and the number of 
bidders and study the effects in these smaller samples. I anticipate that this approach should yield 
better explanations for the current results observed. As my sample consists of targets from 38 
different countries I analyze the differences in the results for different countries and country 
groups in addition to studying the effects in the large sample. The previous research has heavily 
concentrated on targets based in the United States. 
The second research question deals with country-level differences in corporate governance and in 
the resulting level of investor protection and how these affect the outcome of a cross-border tender 
offer. The target management holds large influence over the outcome of a tender offer even 
though it is an offer made directly to the shareholders. In cross-border offers it is possible to 
observe whether better governance and investor protection changes this. The level of corporate 
governance also affects the influence of other stakeholders such as creditors over the company 
matters. In countries where the level of creditor protection is high, creditors should have more 
power in corporate decisions affecting the level of cash flow risk the company faces. 
5 
 
I measure the level of shareholder and creditor protection with the indices constructed by 
Spamann (2010) and Djankov et al. (2007). Also the level of law enforcement and corruption is 
taken into account in the analysis. The differences in investor protection are a fairly new subject in 
M&A research. There are few studies which have looked at the effects of cross-border acquisitions 
causing a corporate governance transfer (Bris and Cabolis, 2008a; 2008b; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). A corporate governance transfer denotes the effect occurring when the level of 
investor protection differs in the bidder and target countries. Bris and Cabolis (2008a, 2008b) and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) measured the effect of the corporate governance transfer to the 
announcement returns of the bidder and the target and found significant positive abnormal returns 
in conjunction with cross-border acquisitions where the bidder comes from a better investor 
protection environment than the target. The abnormal returns are linked to the potential value 
improvements in the target which are achieved through better monitoring of the management 
leading into lesser agency problems. I apply their approach to see whether corporate governance 
transfer and investor protection overall plays any role in defining the outcome of a tender offer.              
Contribution to the existing literature 
The contribution of this thesis to the existing line of literature dealing with the success of tender 
offers is manifold. I test the previous determinants with a larger and more heterogeneous sample. 
This should add credibility and validate some of the previous results. In addition, I use new 
behavioral finance and corporate governance theories to find new evidence about the success of 
tender offers. The areas of contribution are the following:   
1. The main contribution of this thesis comes from the examination of cross-border 
tender offers and the effects of country-level investor protection to the outcome of a 
tender offer. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Bris and Cabolis (2008a; 
2008b) have found positive abnormal returns associated with investor protection 
improving acquisitions, but no study yet, to my knowledge, has examined the 
effects of the level of investor protection to the outcome of a tender offer. 
2. Contrary to previous academic studies focusing to targets in a single, developed 
market area, primarily to the US (Walkling, 1985; Flanagan et al., 1998), I provide 
evidence about tender offer activity from a more general, global perspective. As my 
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sample consists of targets from 38 countries I am able to do some country level 
analysis and comparison for single countries which have sufficient amount of 
observations. My sample size, 3783 observations is distinctly larger than the 
samples used in previous studies which rather used samples with hundreds than 
thousands of observations. This should add some statistical credibility to the 
results. The large sample size also guarantees large enough number of hostile and 
competed bids which provides me an excellent opportunity to analyze these special 
cases of tender offers. 
3. I use behavioral finance theory, specifically the theory about reference points 
(Kahneman, 1992) to further explain the role of the offer premium in tender offers. 
The significance of the offer premium has been a contradictory subject as some 
researchers have found it to be significant while others have not. The use of 
reference point theory in acquisitions has been documented only recently by Baker 
et al. (2009) and the focus of their paper is more on validating the position of the 
target 52-week high price as a meaningful psychological reference point when 
evaluating acquisition offers. But they also show that anchoring the offer price to a 
reference point improves the possibility of success in mergers and acquisitions.  
A few master’s theses have previously studied the success of tender offers. Kallio (2004) 
examines the traditional determinants of success with a European dataset. Aatola (2004) focuses 
on hostile takeovers, takeover defenses and their effect on the outcome of the tender offer. 
Niinivaara (2010) follows closely the paper of Baker et al. (2009) and touches the subject of 
tender offer outcome prediction while trying to find the relevance of the target 52-week high as 
an investor reference point.   
1.3 Main Findings 
Tender offers are found to be a takeover mechanism typical especially for countries which have 
adopted English common law as their legal system. 80 % of all offers are conducted in these 
countries. These countries include the United States and the United Kingdom which are 
considered to have the most sophisticated capital markets in the world. I suspect that private 
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negotiations are strongly favored in countries other than the UK or the UK as a transfer 
mechanism of corporate control.  
The novel findings of this thesis relate to cross-border offers. I evaluate the effect of investor 
protection differences in target and bidder countries to the outcome of tender offers. 
When I test the investor protection variables for the target and the bidder individually I find a bit 
unexpected but logical results. Shareholder protection is found to be insignificant as a 
determinant of tender offer outcome. However, as shareholders vote with their wallets in tender 
offers the result makes sense. All that is required is that the ownership of the individual 
shareholders is recognized. This adds to the line of results published by Spamann (2010) who 
revises the anti-director rights index constructed originally by La Porta et al. (1998). Spamann 
discards many previous results with the corrected index and I can add that shareholder protection 
does not explain the outcome of tender offers either. 
But I find consistent evidence that the level of target creditor protection has a significant, 
negative effect on the outcome of a tender offer. The reason for this lies in the risk-averse nature 
of creditors. Companies based in countries with a high level investor protection follow less risky 
operating and investment strategies (Acharya et al. 2009). Creditors are also more influential in 
these countries. In countries with higher creditor protection the relative size of the private credit 
sector, measured by the proportion of private credit to GDP, is larger, and thus, it is more 
influential (Djankov et al, 2007).  An outside acquirers plan could be to add value by increasing 
the operating risk of the target company. This would make cash flows of the target company 
more volatile. That poses a threat to target creditors, so they react negatively. This setting can be 
seen as an asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in which the creditors resist 
the increase of risk of the target assets by resisting the change of control. The negative effect on 
the outcome is due to creditors using their influence over the target management to resist the bid.                   
The attitude of the target management and competition among bidders are found to be the most 
significant, deal specific determinants of tender offer success. Both are negative and highly 
significant in every model studied in this thesis. I find the offer premium being significant and 
positive in hostile offers which implicates that hostility is used as a negotiation tactic. The 
negative effect of hostility to the outcome of an offer ranges from 37% to 60% while competition 
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among bidders decreases the probability of a single offer succeeding at least by 18%. The impact 
on the success probability of most other independent variables is very small in comparison.  
I find the one week offer premium to be a significant predictor of the outcome of a tender offer. 
This confirms the theoretical reasoning of Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) and the empirical results 
of Walkling (1985). The effect is positive, so a higher premium improves the probability of 
success. To better understand the ambiguity around the significance of the tender offer premium I 
included a variable whether the offer price exceeds the past 52-week high price of the target as a 
psychological reference point found to be meaningful by past studies (Baker et al., 2009). When 
this variable was included the significance of the one week premium faded while the new 
variable was found to be highly significant and have a positive effect on the outcome of the offer. 
This confirms that after exceeding a certain level the significance of the premium is low. I also 
found the offer price exceeding the 52-week high to have a positive effect on the outcome in 
single-bidder situations when the target shareholders cannot compare competing bids but have to 
evaluate the relative level of the offer against some other benchmark. 
Cash is definitely the favored method of payment in tender offers. The higher the level of cash 
used also increases the probability of success significantly. A cash offer is easy to evaluate even 
by a layperson and there is no fear of receiving overvalued stock in return (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003).  
Toeholds have been found consistently to have a positive effect on the tender offer outcome 
Walkling, 1985; Hirsleifer and Titman, 1990; Flanagan et al., 1998). I make a slightly contrary 
finding and confirm that toehold is a significant determinant and has a positive effect on the 
tender offer outcome but only in hostile offers. This result is in line with Betton et al. (2009) who 
associate toeholds mainly with hostile offers. Contrary to toeholds, I find that termination fees are 
mainly used in friendly offers. The use of termination fees is however, limited to US based 
targets and bidders. The inclusion of a termination fee has a significant positive effect on the 
outcome of the offer but it only holds in the sample consisting of US based targets.  
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
As in all research, there were some limitations to this study which are discussed here.  
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First, the lack of data, mainly missing data for offer or stock prices and the method of payment, 
forced me to eliminate almost 2000 tender offers from the initial sample. Further 2000 events 
were eliminated because they lacked historical stock price data necessary in the analysis of 
psychological reference points affecting the outcome of the offer. The heavy elimination of 
events probably hit observations outside the United States relatively more. This led to a bit 
unbalanced sample where almost 40% of the targets were from the US and nearly 80% of the 
targets were located in developed countries with the English common law system in place. This 
decreased the diversity of the sample and limited the amount of country-level comparisons. And 
of course, the sample could be better balanced in the light of successful and failed offers. Only 
15% of all offers were failed ones. 
Due to the scope of this thesis I had to leave variables, such as ownership structure and board and 
management ownership out, which could have been significant factors and added to the 
explanatory power of the models. These factors could have helped in explaining better the hostile 
reactions of the management as well as the amount and role of private benefits enjoyed by the 
management in cross-border offers and in differing investor protection environments. 
Some compromises had to be made in the analysis of cross-border offers and investor protection. 
Observations from certain countries had to be left out as the shareholder protection index 
(Spamann, 2010) covers only 47 countries. The indices for creditor protection, law enforcement 
and corruption are dynamic and adjust in time but the shareholder protection index is a static one. 
This could have affected the results as the change in the level of shareholder protection is not 
reflected in the results. The ideal situation would be to construct a dynamic, more detailed index 
for all countries like Martynova and Renneboog (2010) have done for European countries and the 
US. One last thing I would have liked to include was an accounting standards index, but the only 
one I’m aware of is the one presented in La Porta et al. (1998) which is based on the accounting 
procedures of the year 1990. As there has been a significant development in the international 
accounting standards I decided not to use the index.    
1.5 Key Terms 
This part briefly explains the key terms used most frequently in the thesis.  
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Acquisition is a general term referring to a takeover in which one company takes 
over the control of another company. An acquisition can be conducted through a 
merger or a tender offer. 
Tender offer is an offer made directly to target company shareholders to sell their 
shares to the bidder for a certain offer price. 
Hostile offer is a tender offer which is not approved by the target management. The 
target management may aggressively resist the completion of the offer. 
Competed offer is a situation where multiple bidders present offers for the target 
company shareholders and compete for the control of the target company. 
Offer price is the price offered for the target shares in a tender offer.  
Offer premium is the relative amount by which the offer price exceeds or is below 
the target stock price when the offer is made.   
Toehold represents the percentage of target shares held by the bidder before the 
announcement of the tender offer. 
Reference point is in this context an arbitrary level chosen by the investor to which 
the investor compares the offer price.  
Investor protection is a general expression for shareholder and creditor protection. 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
The rest of the thesis is structured as following. In Section 2 I go through the existing literature 
on acquisitions, tender offers and corporate governance more thoroughly. The hypotheses based 
on the theory are presented after that in Section 3. Section 4 describes the dataset and research 
methods used. The empirical results are then presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the academic literature about acquisitions and tender offers and builds the 
necessary theoretical framework for evaluating the success of tender offers. I will first go through 
the general theories concerning mergers and acquisitions and factors that drive the takeover 
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market, and then plunge deeper into matters relating to tender offers and the determinants which 
academic literature has found to have the most significant effect on the tender offer outcome. In 
addition, I will provide reasons from the existing literature that why these factors are 
determinants of takeover success and what causes them.   
The last part of the literature review concentrates on studies about different corporate governance 
and legal systems, their characteristics, and on the effects of country-level differences in investor 
protection in cross-border acquisitions. 
2.1 Theories of Mergers and Acquisitions 
There is said to be a market for corporate control in which managers compete with each other for 
the control of corporate resources (Manne, 1965). Jensen and Ruback (1983) define corporate 
control as the right to determine the management of corporate resources. Competition for these 
corporate resources arise as managers think they are able to use the resources more efficiently or 
apply an alternative operating strategy that will enable the more efficient use of those resources 
and increase the value of their company (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983). Managers can obtain 
the control of these resources through acquisitions of other companies or their assets.  
Takeover methods 
Acquisition is a general term which refers to any takeover. Manne (1965) defines two major 
takeover methods, direct purchase of shares and merger. The most common method of share 
purchase is to make an offer on the open market (tender offer) for a certain percentage of shares 
outstanding. Other option would be to buy the shares from large individual owners privately 
preserving secrecy and allowing negotiation on price. Also, the possible acquirer may make a bid 
for tenders, a request for the shareholders to make an offer for him for the shares. This method is 
inconvenient especially with companies which have a large shareholder base. In addition to direct 
share purchases a merger can be used to complete an acquisition. In a merger two companies 
combine their resources into a single company. Shares instead of cash are typically used as the 
method of payment. Mergers are the product of negotiations between the management of the 
bidder and the target so they are friendly acquisitions whereas a takeover through share purchases 
can be completed with or without target management’s approval.  
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Agency problems and hubris 
Halpern (1983) identifies two classes of different acquisition theories. The first one deals with 
non-value maximizing behavior of managers. Acquisitions of this type have no economic gains to 
be divided among the parties of the acquisition, the target and the acquirer. Any positive gains for 
other party will result in negative gains for the other. Acquisitions are attempts to maximize sales 
or assets and grow the “empire” that the managers control. This theory is supported by Jensen 
(1986) who argues that managers whose companies have performed well in the past and have 
abundant free cash flow are likely to engage in value-reducing acquisitions which increase the 
size of the company but decrease its shareholder value. Another supporting theory is laid down 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1989) who build a model of managerial entrenchment. According to the 
model managers will engage in investments that increase the value of managers to shareholders 
but do not increase value of the company itself.  
Also psychological factors can lead into non-value maximizing acquisitions. Roll (1986) created 
a theory suggesting that managers engage into takeovers because they suffer from managerial 
hubris i.e. they believe that they are better in controlling assets than other managers. This leads 
into overbidding in takeover contests and shareholder value destruction. Hubris theory suggests 
that mergers can occur even if they have no effects on value. Another version of hubris is CEO 
overconfidence discussed by Malmendier and Tate (2008). They find that overconfident CEOs 
are more likely to make acquisitions, they overpay for targets and the acquisitions undertaken by 
companies led by overconfident CEOs are value-destroying.  
Synergies  
The second set of theories presented by Halpern (1983) is about value-maximizing acquisitions. 
These acquisitions result into positive economic gains which derive from multiple different 
sources. These sources include redeployment of excess cash held by the target or the acquirer, 
reducing the probability of default and increasing debt capacity through diversification, creation 
synergies and reduction of information asymmetries such as undervaluation of target shares only 
known only to the acquirer prior the acquisition. Value maximization can also be motivated by 
replacing the incumbent management or operating strategy with a more efficient one.     
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Synergies derive from control of the target which enables the acquirer to redeploy the combined 
assets of the two firms. Sources for value creation include more efficient management, economies 
of scale, improved production techniques, combination of complementary resources and 
increased market power (Bradley et al., 1983).  Bradley et al. (1988) confirm the synergy 
hypothesis in their event study of tender offers and document that successful acquisitions 
increase the combined value of the target and the acquirer by 7.4% on average. Most of the gain 
is captured by the shareholders of the target but also acquiring firms realize significant positive 
abnormal returns. A more recent study by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) contradicts 
the prediction that both parties win in acquisitions. They find that acquirer returns are related to 
company size and large acquirers pay large premiums and gain negative returns. They link this 
result to the hubris hypothesis presented by Roll (1986). 
Information asymmetries, industry shocks and merger waves         
Information asymmetries and perceived under or overvaluation of companies has also been listed 
as a reason for acquisitions.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model which implies that 
acquisitions are driven by stock market valuations. Overvalued firms know that they are 
overvalued and try to make acquisitions of undervalued firms with their own stock. Acquisition 
activity increases when dispersion of valuation among firms grows (acquiring with stock 
becomes more affordable). This can be industry-specific (certain sector of the market being 
overvalued), so acquisition activity centers on a certain industry creating merger waves, such as 
the conglomerate mergers of 1960s and the dot-com boom of the late 1990s which both occurred 
during periods of high market valuations. The paper by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
also supports the theory that market valuations drive merger waves. 
Other explanation given for merger waves and acquisitions in general has been the neoclassical 
theory (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). The neoclassical theory treats mergers as the response to 
industry shocks due to changes in an industry’s economic, technological or regulatory 
environment. Harford (2005) investigates the two explanations given for merger waves, the 
neoclassical and behavioral theory (managers taking advantage of misvaluation) with the merger 
activity of 1980s and 1990s and concludes that in these cases the merger waves were caused by 
industry level shocks. Shocks are not the sole reason for merger waves as the forming of a wave 
also requires macro-level liquidity to support the continuous merger activity.        
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2.2 Tender Offers 
As mentioned before a tender offer is one form of acquiring a company. Bradley (1980) defines a 
tender offer as a bid for the right to control the resources of the target firm. It is a proposal made 
by the management of a firm to purchase a significant fraction of the outstanding stock of another 
company. The offer is made directly to the stockholders of the target firm. The offer is successful 
if the acquirer manages to acquire the amount of shares required to control the company. 
First, the bidder typically seeks the approval of the company board of directors and management. 
If the management favors the bid and recommends shareholders to accept it, the offer is said to be 
friendly and if the management opposes and does not recommend accepting it, the bid is hostile. 
However, the beauty of tender offers is that the target shareholders have the final vote with their 
wallets, so the bid can succeed even without management approval. The offer can be conditional 
or unconditional; in a conditional offer the acquirer requires that he will acquire a certain 
percentage of the target shares, otherwise he will not buy any shares at all. The offer can also be 
restricted or unrestricted; in a restricted offer the acquirer sets a limit of a maximum percentage 
of shares it is willing to buy. 
In a hostile takeover the acquirer makes a tender offer for the shareholders of the target company 
despite the opposition of the target management. Hostility is perceived as aggressive rejection of 
the public tender offer (Schwert, 2000). Hostility can be used to reject the tender offer totally or it 
can be used in many cases as a negotiation tactic to increase the premium offered for the target 
shareholders. The target company can use all kinds of defensive measures to prevent the acquirer 
from completing the tender offer. It can use poison pills or even invite a white knight, an acquirer 
favored by target management, to acquire the shares of the target company. 
Other characteristic of tender offers is that they can be contested. As the tender offer process is 
public, the announcement of the first bid may invite other competing bidders to bid for the 
control of the target as well. Bradley (1980), states that information produced by the initial offer 
enables other firms to make value-increasing changes in the target firm. The initial bid is a signal 
about the real value of the target company. However, management hostility and inviting white 
knights in play usually increases competition which can be a tactic used by the target to drag the 
offer price upwards (Schwert, 2000). Also Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) link hostility and 
competition closely together.       
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Some tender offers are required by legislation. Depending on the country and the legislative 
system a shareholder is required to make a mandatory bid to all other shareholders when its 
ownership stake in a company exceeds a certain limit (30%, 50% etc.). Also, usually if one 
shareholder owns over 90% of all the shares in a company he has the right and the obligation to 
tender the remaining shares and “squeeze-out” the remaining minority shareholders. On the other 
hand, the minority shareholders also have the sell-out right in the similar situation.         
Tender offer process 
The tender offer process is divided into three different time periods: pre-announcement, post-
announcement and post-execution. Typically offers are announced two to three weeks in advance 
of the date of execution (Bradley, 1980). The time between announcement date and execution 
date is the offer period during which the shareholders have to decide whether to tender their 
shares or not. In this thesis I will concentrate on the pre-announcement period. The prediction of 
success is based on the factors known after the target is selected but before the offer is made.  
Failure of tender offers   
Not all tender offers succeed. Actually a major fraction of all tender offers do fail due to multiple 
reasons. The most influential single reason is the resistance of target management (Walkling, 
1985). Bradley et al. (1983) record 112 initial unsuccessful tender offers in their total sample of 
371 tender offers. Unsuccessful initial tender offers count for over 30% of their sample. 
However, Fabozzi et al. (1988) note that many of unsuccessful bids in their sample were revised 
bids. They confirm with this with a sample of their own spanning from 1977 to 1983 that 
approximately 17% of tender offers actually fail. Flanagan et al. (1998) show that 23% of 
takeovers between 1977 and 1988 were unsuccessful.  The same is observed on the other side of 
the Atlantic. Holl and Kyriazis (1996) gather a sample of 238 tender offers from the UK during 
the 1980s. 60 bids or about 25% of the sample were unsuccessful.     
Failing in a tender offer has its costs to both parties involved. The costs for the bidder are more 
straightforward and easier to comprehend. Screening for targets, planning and executing the offer 
take time, especially top management time, money and require many times the use of costly 
advisors. Also, if a company loses a tender offer contest to a close competitor it might drive the 
loser into a bad competitive position on the product market. Bradley et al. (1983) confirm that on 
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average the stockholders of unsuccessful bidding firms suffer a significant wealth loss after the 
termination of the offer. This happens only in situations where the company loses a contested bid 
to a rival bidder. If the bid fails but the target is not acquired by another company either there is 
no adverse wealth effect. They conclude that losing a bid for resources to a rival puts the 
company in a position of competitive disadvantage at the marketplace. 
A failed tender offer has its implications on the target as well. Fabozzi et al. (1988) show that the 
premium offered disappears from the stock price the year after the announcement of the 
withdrawal. Second, the target is not able to generate any abnormal excess returns in the post-
announcement year. Ruback (1988), finds that the loss of excess abnormal returns for the target 
can last three years after the termination of the offer, which implies that the failure of a control 
contest is costly also for the shareholders of the target firm.       
2.3 Determinants of Tender Offer Success 
The determinants of tender offer success can be divided into multiple categories according to 
their nature: deal specific unique to each deal, target and bidding company specific, determinants 
relating to industry and the relation between the two companies engaged in the offer. The focus 
of this thesis is on predicting the outcome of the offer based on the deal and relation specific 
matters with a few variables relating to company and industry specific matters.  
I will not take financials or asset structure into consideration as those are factors which affect the 
selection of the target more than the actual outcome of the tender. Those have been already 
proven to be insignificant in determining the outcome of the offer by previous studies (Ebeid, 
1974; Hoffmeister and Dyl, 1981). The movement of share prices is another factor that has been 
proved to predict the outcome of acquisitions, and is used in merger arbitrage (Brown and 
Raymond, 1986). Share price movements predict the outcome during the offer period after the 
offer is announced while I try to contribute to the prediction of the outcome before the 
announcement. 
The single factor that contributes the most on the success of a tender offer is the attitude of the 
target management. Hostile reaction has a negative effect on the outcome of the offer. Another 
much discussed factor, the size of the offer premium divides opinions, although recent studies 
have linked the premium into psychological reference points and gained evidence about the 
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positive effect of the premium to the outcome. Other factors analyzed include pre-bid ownership 
in the target, competition and the method of payment as well as a few other less studied 
determinants.   
First, I will go through the comprehensive studies about tender offer success prediction which 
take as many predicting variables into consideration as they see fit for the purpose. After, that I 
revise the literature that focuses more on single variables which have been proven to have an 
effect on the outcome of the offer. 
Comprehensive studies 
I begin the review of comprehensive studies relating to tender offer success prediction with the 
theoretical paper by Hirsleifer and Titman (1990). They present a model of tender offers in which 
the bid reveals perfectly the private information the bidder has about the target and the value 
improvement that can be generated by the takeover. The authors improve previous models of 
tender offers (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) by adding the possibility of 
failure to their own model. A fundamental property of the bidding game is that shareholders are 
more likely to accept high than low bids. This implies that bidders with high value improvements 
and consequently high valuations are more likely to win contests. The offered premium is also 
increasing with the number of bidders involved. The authors also take shareholder free-riding and 
potential management resistance into consideration. They notice that management resistance can 
sometimes affect the bid outcome positively as it reveals information about the target and 
encourages higher bids.  
The model suggests that one of the key determinants of the outcome of the tender offer is the 
amount of information possessed by the target shareholders. If information is symmetric then the 
bidder can tailor its bid to reflect the value of the company. But if information is asymmetric 
even overbidding might not win the contest as target shareholders may consider the bid to low if 
they interpret that the post-takeover value of the company is higher. In addition to the premium 
offered and management resistance, Hirsleifer and Titman find that high initial shareholding 
(toehold) by the bidder and the possibility of dilution of minority shareholders increase the 
probability of successful offer outcome. 
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The most important empirical study on the subject of takeover prediction has been made by 
Walkling (1985). He tests the variables affecting to tender offer success empirically with a 
sample of 158 US cash tender offers registered during the period 1972 through 1977, with both 
linear and logistic regressions. Previous studies had used linear models but Walkling argues that 
logistic regression should be better suited for predicting probabilities. Previous papers also had 
results which contradict the standard economic theory. The studies had found that the tender offer 
premium is not a significant factor influencing tender offer outcome.  
Walkling argues that the results are due to false specification of the offer premium. This can be 
due to the fact that in many cases the offer is published in newspapers before the SEC filing. To 
overcome this misspecification he uses three different percentage premiums measured at different 
points in time: premium based on the market price fourteen days before the SEC filing, premium 
based on market price fourteen days prior the earliest of SEC dates or offer announcement and 
the pro rata effect weighted average of the second premium. Other modeled variables include 
managerial resistance, pre-offer ownership in the target held be the bidder, solicitation fees paid 
to brokers by the bidder and competing bids. Bid success is defined as the situation in which the 
bidder acquires greater than the average number of shares sought. 
The main results of Walkling are the following: management resistance has a significant negative 
impact on the offer outcome and bidder toehold in the target is a positively significant variable. 
The bid premium size is significant and positive contrary to previous results when measured prior 
the market has received any information about the offer. So, the specification of the premium is 
very important. Also solicitation fees to brokers increase the chance of success. 
The earlier studies about this subject were all made with US data as well. Hoffmeister and Dyl 
(1981) model and study 84 cash tender offers made during 1976 and 1977, whose outcome was 
known and had enough public data for the study. They use linear regression models for their 
analysis. 17 independent variables were used to develop the model. Financial position variables 
included current ratio, profit margin, payout ratio, dividend yield, P/E ratio, return on equity and 
growth in earnings and dividends for the two years prior the offer. Industry position was 
measured by comparative current ratio, profitability and return to equity. Other variables included 
percentage of outstanding shares being sought, market value of the target, toehold owned by the 
bidder, the size of the bid premium two weeks before the tender announcement measured from 
19 
 
market and book values and the attitude of the management. Out of all these variables they 
confirm that management resistance is decisive in determining the outcome of tender offers. 
Other significant and negative variable was target firm size. Growth in earnings, current ratio, 
payout ratio and P/E ratio had lesser effect on the success. The tender offer premium was found 
to be an insignificant estimator of the success or failure of the tender offer.     
Three Ph.D. dissertations by Quirin (1971), Pelligrino (1972) and Ebeid (1974) take a view on 
the factors affecting the outcome of tender offers. Ebeid tests twenty eight different variables 
measuring different operating, market and bid characteristics. Only target management resistance 
has an effect to the outcome of the bid. The same result is confirmed by Pelligrino’s paper. The 
only paper from the 1970s stating that bid premium has an influence on the outcome of the bid is 
made by Quirin. 
The most recent US based study about tender offer success is made by Flanagan et al. (1998). It 
is the most comprehensive one done so far with a sample size of 991 tender offers spanning over 
the time period of 1985 to 1994. The dataset is new compared to previous studies done in the 
1980. They also use variables which had not been previously studied such as termination fees, 
family ownership of a target, nationality of a target and the payment method used in the 
transaction. The probability of tender offer success was positively affected by same primary 
industry status, cross-border status, the presence of termination fees and the size of the toehold 
the acquirer held at the day of the announcement. The probability of success was negatively 
affected by the use of a two-tier deal structure, competing bidders and negative target 
management reaction. Bid premium, target profitability or family ownership did not make a 
significant difference to tender offer outcome.        
Although, the majority of tender offer studies have been made in the US and with US data, there 
are few studies done with European data as well. Holl and Kyriazis (1996) test the determinants 
of takeover success with a sample of 238 takeover attempts made in the UK during the 1980s. In 
addition to the usual variables used to predict the success of tender offers they also investigate the 
role of different types of share ownership. They find evidence which support the previous line of 
literature in the prediction of tender offer outcome. Management resistance and the wealth effects 
of the bid (premium) have a significant effect to the outcome. Also, pre-offer toehold and the 
ownership of the target directors are also significant factors contributing to the outcome. 
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Elsland and Weber (2006) present evidence from German tender offers in their working paper. 
They analyze 105 tender offers (mandatory, takeover and acquisition offers) made in Germany 
during the period between 2002 and 2005. What is novel in their approach in comparison to 
traditional papers predicting takeover success is that they combine the traditional determinants 
with behavioral factors, particularly with the reference point effect, which may influence the 
target shareholders’ decision and thus the whole outcome of the tender offer. The authors use 
prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as the backbone of their argument. Prospect 
theory indicates that investors are risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses. Reference 
point theory suggests that shareholders evaluate their selling decision relative to a mental 
reference point (Kahneman, 1992). Gains and losses realized by the investor are related to some 
familiar but possibly economically irrelevant reference point such as wage the investor has 
chosen as a benchmark. Because of this reference points are relevant in analyzing takeovers and 
the premiums offered and accepted.  
In the paper of Elsland and Weber the 52-week high and low prices of the target and a 52-week 
relative compensation based on the high and low values are used as reference point over which 
the offer premium is calculated in addition to the premium measured with conventional methods. 
Their results are in line with the previous literature concerning the traditional determinants of 
tender offer success. Target management attitude and high tendering have a positive relationship. 
Also the type of the offer has an effect to the tendering behavior. The behavioral factors are 
found significant. The relative compensation measure and tender offer success have a positive 
correlation. 
Another paper that includes behavioral variables into the prediction of takeover success is the 
working paper written by Baker et al. (2009). They use judgmental anchors or reference points to 
determine whether offer prices, deal success, market reaction and merger waves are affected by 
these reference points. Their sample consists of 7498 deals (of which 1522 are tender offers) 
from the period of 1984 to 2007 and probit regression is used to analyze the sample. The authors 
reason that the reference point theory complements other theories of mergers; especially in the 
case of analyzing the offer premia. They focus especially on the 52-week high as a judgmental 
reference point for investors as it is widely reported in financial press and thus provides an easy 
psychological benchmark for valuing a company . The paper finds evidence of offer prices being 
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biased toward1s the 52-week high and that the probability of deal success increases when the 
tender offer price exceeds the 52-week high. In their sample the probability of success is 69.9% 
for deals in which the offer price does not exceed the 52-week high and 76.9% for deals in which 
it does exceed the 52-week high. 
The 52-week high is measured for the 52-week period ending 30 days before the announcement 
date to avoid the effect of deal rumors on the offer premium. Other variables used include offer 
premium, payment method, target management attitude, deal type and the logarithm of target and 
bidder market capitalization. In addition to the positive effect of the offer price exceeding the 52-
week high, Baker et al. note that target management hostility and target size reduce the 
probability of success while bidder size and the deal being a tender offer increase the probability 
of success.                             
After reviewing the comprehensive studies about takeover success I now proceed to analyze the 
studies which provide information about the single factors, some already covered in the 
comprehensive studies, which have an effect on the outcome of the takeover.  
Target management resistance     
Based on the comprehensive studies it is already clear that target management plays a huge role 
in deciding the outcome of the takeover attempt. Almost all comprehensive studies (Pelligrino, 
1972; Ebeid, 1974; Hoffmeister and Dyl, 1981; Walkling, 1985, Hirsleifer and Titman, 1990; 
Holl and Kyriazis, 1996; Flanagan et al. 1998; Elsland and Weber, 2006; Baker et al. 2009)   
noted that target management resistance is the single largest factor affecting the outcome of 
takeovers and has mainly a negative effect on the probability of success.  
Baron (1983) constructs a theoretical model of takeovers to resolve the puzzle of management 
resistance. To resist an offer the target may use may use multiple defenses such as purchase its 
own shares, file antitrust suits, attempt to acquire another firm or sell assets to make itself less 
attractive to the offeror. Also shark repellents which make acquiring a majority stake hard or 
charter provisions that require supermajority votes of shareholders for business combinations or 
classified boards serve as good defense mechanisms against takeovers. His hypothesis is that 
management resists takeovers because they think that the current offer is too low and does not 
represent the true value of the company. Other reason for resistance is the need for managers to 
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stay in control of the company. They find that managers also resist a bid that fully reflects the 
value of their company if they think that there might be a bidder with a higher valuation of the 
company who will join the contest. Baron concludes that rejection also acts as a signal of true 
value of the company. If a bid is rejected because the management acts in the interest of 
shareholders the initial value of the company should increase but if they reject just because they 
try to maintain control the initial value of the company will decrease. Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1993) give empirical evidence to the hypothesis that management resists bids that they believe to 
be too low. They find that resistance is decreasing with the size of the bid premium.   
Schwert (2000) examines hostility in takeovers empirically in his paper. By analyzing a sample 
of 2346 takeover contests occurred in the US between 1975 and 1996 he tries to find differences 
between friendly and hostile deals and reasons for management resistance. He defines hostility as 
aggressive rejection of the bid by the target firm. He finds little difference in the financial 
variables, such as market-to-book ratio and return on equity that should measure poor managerial 
performance and differentiate friendly and hostile takeovers. However, he finds evidence that 
support the theory of using hostility as a tool for strategic bargaining. Managers are seeking-out 
competitors for bidders and declare hostile status to increase the premium offered. Because of 
this Schwert interprets hostility more as a bargaining strategy than a sign of managerial 
entrenchment. 
Franks and Mayer (1996) study whether hostile takeovers act as a disciplinary device for 
managers and boards in the UK by examining hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986. They find 
evidence of high board turnover and level of restructuring after the takeovers but little evidence 
of poor performance prior to bids suggesting that hostile takeovers. However, they find higher 
bid premiums in hostile takeovers. Rather than acting as a device of market discipline, hostility is 
due to dissatisfaction towards the terms of the offer. 
Several other papers try to explain the reasons behind managerial resistance to takeovers by 
linking management resistance with managerial compensation, wealth and career prospects. 
Walkling and Long (1984) present a hypothesis that tender offers are an ideal setting to analyze 
agency problems since manager and shareholder interests are often in conflict. They analyze this 
by using s sample of cash tender offers. They find evidence about the relationship of target 
management compensation and their attitude towards tender offers. Positive wealth change to 
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managers was correlated with non-resistance and the potential wealth change was found to be 
significantly higher in uncontested offers. Also, at least one of the top two managers was 
employed at the company after the takeover in 81% of the successful offers which were not 
resisted. The figure was only 43% for takeovers which the management did resist.  
Cotter and Zenner (1994) document a negative relationship between the likelihood of target 
management resistance and change in managerial wealth. The relation between takeover success 
and managerial wealth is therefore positive. On average they find that resistance does not 
increase the wealth of shareholders, managers and directors. This suggests that shareholders do 
not benefit from the resistance, but managers may benefit. By retaining the control of the 
company they keep the possible private benefits of control. 
The paper by Agrawal and Walkling (1994) continue with the same theme and investigates the 
relation between takeovers and executive careers. They are the first to empirically examine the 
subject of executive careers after takeovers bids for their firms. They find clear reasons for 
resistance as target CEOs are more likely to get fired if the bid succeeds. In addition to difficulty 
of retaining their current CEO position the authors find that CEOs that lose their jobs in takeovers 
fail to find a new top management position during the following three years after the bid. On the 
other hand CEOs who managed to keep their position after the change of ownership experience 
an increase in their compensation if the level of compensation was not excessive prior to the bid. 
It provides evidence of market discipline and correction of inefficient incentive contracts.  
One interesting case in management resistance to takeovers is the leveraged buy-out (LBO) 
which can be considered as a device of market discipline. Some attributes of LBOs should favor 
the target management resistance to but some should oppose it. In an LBO, usually private equity 
companies use large amounts of debt to buy a company and take it private. Large amount of debt 
is used partly as a control function (Jensen, 1986). In many cases LBOs alleviate agency 
problems of the top-level managers as they receive a considerable equity stake in the company as 
an incentive to perform, but they are also strictly monitored by the private equity owners. Berger 
and Ofek (1996) prove that firms that incur greatest value losses are most likely to be bought by 
LBO associations. These firms are usually diversified firms which suffer from heavy 
diversification discounts. Acquirers create value by “busting-up” these firms; breaking them up 
and selling the pieces or conducting heavy restructuring of the business otherwise. These bust-
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ups break the empires created by the existing management (Jensen, 1986). So, LBOs are a 
double-edged sword for managers. On the other hand they get proper incentives to perform very 
well, but on the other hand they might get fired, at least lose control and private benefits, are 
monitored very closely and may end up with considerably lower base compensation as they 
receive more performance based compensation. No previous study about takeover success has 
taken LBOs into consideration as a possible explanation for target management hostility and as a 
factor affecting the outcome of a tender offer. 
Competing offers 
As tender offers are public in their nature, the initial public offer reveals information about the 
target and may attract other bidders to compete with the initial bidder if other bidders value the 
target higher than the initial bid was (Fishman, 1988). Another reason for competition in tender 
offers is hostile bids. If target management resists a bid made by an unwelcome bidder, they 
might ask a white knight, a friendly bidder favored by the target management, to join the bidding 
contest to prevent the hostile bidder from winning the control contest. Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1993) and Schwert (2000) confirm that target hostility increases the possibility of competition. 
Acquiring a toehold in the target could a way to reduce the probability of competition. Jennings 
and Mazzeo (1993) prove empirically that high premiums can reduce the probability of 
competition arising.  
The relation between takeover success and competition should be quite clear. As the number of 
bidders increase, the probability of each individual bidder succeeding should decrease. 
Interestingly, many studies examining the probability of takeover success do not take competing 
offers into consideration as a determinant of the outcome. The empirical study by Flanagan et al. 
(1998) does and shows that competition has a significant, negative effect on the probability of 
winning the takeover contest.  
An empirical study by Bradley et al. (1988) about the wealth effects of tender offer 
announcements presents results which show that competition among bidding firms increases the 
returns to target and decreases the returns of the acquirer. This implies that bidders pay higher 
premiums in contested offers which reflect the true value of the target better. The same result is 
modeled in theory by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990). Their model implies that targets do 
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benefit from competition between bidders and realize larger gains. Betton and Eckbo (2000) 
observe lower initial bid premiums in multiple bidder contests than in situations with a single 
bidder (45% vs. 51%) but report that bid premiums increase significantly between subsequent 
bids. The median increase in the bid price between the first and second bid is 10% and the 
corresponding increase in the initial premium equals 31%. 
The effect of competition to takeover success is not that well documented, but according to the 
results of Flanagan et al. (1998) and common sense competition will decrease the probability of 
takeover success. However, what is clear from literature is that competition definitely favors the 
target and increases premiums paid by bidders.        
Tender offer premium 
As already seen in the comprehensive papers about predicting takeover success, the tender offer 
premium and its significance as a predictor of tender offer success has been a subject which has 
divided opinions. According to standard economic theory the relation between premium size and 
probability of success should be straightforward. Higher premium should equal a higher 
probability of success. Otherwise, high premiums observed by empirical papers, such as Bradley 
(1980) who reports a premium of 49% paid by successful bidders, would not make any sense. 
This is proved in the paper of Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) who predict a linear relationship 
between bid premium and the probability of takeover success. Empirical research has found 
evidence for the bid premium being significant (Quirin, 1971; Walkling, 1985; Holl and Kyriazis, 
1996) and against (Pelligrino 1972; Ebeid, 1974; Hoffmeister and Dyl 1981; Flanagan et al., 
1998). Elsland and Weber (2006) and Baker et al. (2009) find that bid premium is significant 
when compared to a relevant psychological reference point. One reason for the division of results 
is probably the assumption of rational and shareholder value maximizing managers. As the 
literature about management resistance shows managers are not rational and in many cases put 
their own welfare before the shareholder value. 
Despite of this empirical confusion there are still theoretical facts that favor the assumption that 
bid premium is a contributing factor to tender offer success. Fishman (1988) develops a model 
about takeover auctions that investigates the role of the premium offered in takeover contests. 
The assumption for the model is information is asymmetric and bidding reveals information 
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about the target to other potential bidders and bidders are able to learn from other bids. The 
higher the first bid is, the lower is the second bidders expected return. Thus, Fishman proves that 
a high initial offer signaling high valuation of the target may pre-empt a second bidder from 
entering the contest and improve his probability of winning the control contest. Hirsleifer and 
Png (1989) report similar results in their theoretical paper. 
Grossman and Hart (1980) provide an explanation with their “free-rider problem” why even a 
high premium offered might sometimes be turned down by the shareholders of the target. They 
present a theory about a widely-held company whose shareholders own such a small piece of the 
company that they do not have an incentive to monitor or improve the management. However, 
there is a corporate raider who can significantly improve the value of the company if the takes 
over. A single shareholder cannot affect the outcome of the tender offer, so when the raider tries 
to take over, the shareholders sense that they can benefit more (than from tendering their shares) 
from the value improvements applied by the raider if he takes over and choose not to tender their 
shares. This kind of “free-riding” can prevent the raider from taking over the company and all 
shareholders loose. 
Even if the significance of the bid premium to the outcome of the takeover is divides academic 
opinions it seems that other factors such as competition (Walkling and Edmister, 1985) and 
management resistance (Schwert, 2000) will drive the premiums upward and are frequently used 
by target management as bargaining methods. Walkling & Edmister find empirical evidence that 
multiple bidders lead into higher takeover premiums on average. Schwert confirms this with 
hostile deals as well. Also, Schwert finds that in many cases hostility is connected to multiple 
bidder contests. Next, I will discuss bidder toeholds and how those can deter competition and 
lower the premium paid by acquirers.   
Pre-bid ownership in target – “toehold” 
Empirical studies have found strong evidence of the positive effects of toeholds preceding 
takeover offers or contests. Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) report initial holdings to be a factor that 
improves the probability of takeover success in their theoretical paper. Empirical studies on 
takeover success prediction by Walkling (1985), Holl and Kyriazis (1996), Flanagan et al. (1998) 
and Elsland & Weber (2006) have found a toehold to increase the probability of success. 
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The importance of a toehold has interested the academics for quite some time. I will first cover 
the theoretical papers and then provide some empirical studies on the subject of toeholds. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) discuss the role of large minority shareholders to a company. Large 
shareholders are identified as families, pension and profit-sharing plans, and different kinds of 
financial companies. One benefit of large minority shareholders is that they alleviate the free-
rider problem presented by Grossman and Hart (1980) by monitoring the management. But large 
shareholdings can have an effect on takeovers as well. If monitoring cannot be done, large 
shareholders can facilitate takeovers. When the shareholdings of a single shareholder grow, the 
probability of that shareholder taking over the company also increases. Also, the premium paid 
by that acquirer is likely be lower as the large shareholder is willing to take over for a smaller 
increase in the firm’s profits as he gains most of the profits through larger ownership. 
Bulow et al. (1999), state that toeholds have an enormous impact in takeover battles. It is also a 
profitable strategy as aggressive bids increase the value of the company and the value of the 
toehold the bidder already possesses. Bulow et al. concentrate on takeover battles between 
financial buyers (common-value auction) as they have usually similar strategies to generate 
returns in comparison to strategic buyers (private-value auction) which all may utilize the target 
assets in a different way. First, as a toehold creates an incentive to bid aggressively. This inflicts 
a winner’s curse on the bidder who does not have a toehold in the company. This can lead to an 
exit by the non-toehold bidder and the toehold holder can takeover cheaply. If both bidders have 
a toehold it will result in aggressive bids and high premiums. 
Goldman and Qian (2005) present a theory of optimal toehold size in takeover contests and 
answer why raiders do not acquire a toehold before bidding even though the literature supports it. 
They confirm that the probability of success is increasing with the size of the toehold. They 
assume that takeover success or failure signals the level of managerial entrenchment (private 
benefits) and the future value of the firm. Higher level of entrenchment implies a lower firm 
value to outside shareholders. So, if a takeover with large toehold fails due to management 
resistance it signals high level of managerial private benefits which bring the firm value down. 
Also Bris (2002) provides a theory which opposes the general consensus of the benefits of a 
toehold in acquisitions. His argument is that acquiring a toehold will lead into a costly share price 
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run-up as the market anticipates the increased probability of a takeover and incorporates the 
potential value improvements to the target share price. So, acquirers will decrease their open 
market purchases to avoid this pre-bid share price run-up. So, toeholds and probability of 
takeover success and offer premium have a negative correlation. Schwert (1996) finds evidence 
of target share price run-ups which can result in additional costs to the bidder.  
Betton and Eckbo (2000) study the effects of toeholds in takeover contests empirically and how 
they affect the nature of the contests. They measure the effects of toeholds with a sample of 2335 
takeover bids from 1971 to 1990. They also structure the takeover contest in the form of a tender 
offer contest tree. They find that toeholds are largest, 20% on average, in single bidder contests 
whereas the size of the average toehold is only 5% in multi-bidder contests. The relation between 
toehold and offer premium is found to be negative, high toeholds implies a small takeover 
premium. This implies that holding a toehold decreases the probability of competition and also 
target management resistance. Despite these findings the authors find that only 53% of the 
bidders acquire pre-bid stakes in the target company. Overall, they find that offer premium, 
toehold and pre-bid tender agreement contribute significantly to the outcome of the bid. 
Betton et al. (2009) inspects the toehold puzzle in a more recent paper as well. In their sample of 
US takeovers spanning over the period of 1973 to 2002 they find that toehold bidding is rare, 
only 13% of initial bidders seeking control over a public company have toeholds. However, when 
toeholds exist they are quite large, averaging to 20 % and 14% with toeholds purchased within 
half a year of the announcement. They associate toeholds more with hostile bids and bids over 
private than public companies. Toeholds are non-existent in friendly takeovers or mergers. 
Toeholds were frequent in the takeovers of 1980s but have declined since. 
The fact that having a toehold in the target increases the probability of taking over the target 
successfully seems quite clear according to the literature. A toehold should also decrease 
competition and target management hostility which should decrease the premium required by 
target shareholders. But empirical studies have not found much evidence of friendly bidders 
acquiring toeholds but associate them mostly with hostile offers over private companies. This 
could be due the argument made by Bris (2002) that toeholds give away information about the 
target and lead to target share price run-ups prior to bids holds in the offers made to public 
companies.                           
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Method of payment 
The literature about the medium of payment in acquisitions seems to be closely linked with 
studies about competition between bidders. The most common methods of payment in takeovers 
are cash, shares or the combination of these two. Payment in cash is more concrete and easier to 
evaluate by the target while the value of shares is always relative and valuation subjective matter.  
Travlos (1987) observes that cash is favored as a method of payment in tender offers whereas 
mergers are often paid by the shares of the acquiring company. Cash deals are quicker to register 
with the supervisory authorities which favor using cash in tender offers. Cash and stock payments 
convey different signals to investors and are also treated differently in taxation. Travlos confirms 
that stock exchange deals result in negative returns to acquirer shareholders which signal about 
the use of stock as a medium of exchange by overvalued acquirers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
confirm that overvalued buyers will try to exploit this information asymmetry. Hansen (1987) 
concludes that because of proprietary information and the resulting information asymmetry 
overvalued acquirers will try to use their own shares and undervalued ones use cash as the 
medium of exchange.  
Competitive auctions and the choice of payment method have been investigated closely together. 
In the model of Fishman (1989) information is asymmetric and high preemptive bids may be 
used to deter the competition and win the auction. Equity is offered by low valuing bidders and 
cash by high valuing bidders. The value of the acquirer’s shares is uncertain because it is 
conditional on the profitability of the takeover. So, a bidder may signal high valuation by using 
cash as the method of payment. The use of cash will deter competition and decrease management 
resistance.  
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) & Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) both find that the proportion of 
cash used as a part of the payment increases with the number of competing bidders. Berkovitch 
and Narayanan also prove that using cash increases the returns to both target and bidder 
shareholders. The empirical study by Jennings and Mazzeo, contrary to Fishman’s (1989) 
findings, does not find that the use of cash as a payment method would deter competition and 
decrease the likelihood of managerial resistance to the bid. However, there is evidence of bid 
premium deterring both competition and management resistance. 
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Cash seems to be the weapon of choice for tender offer contenders. Its simplicity and favorable 
signaling qualities support the use of cash as method of payment. Even though there is no direct 
evidence that the choice of payment method would somehow affect the outcome of the takeover, 
it seems that the use of cash alleviates management resistance and competition between bidders 
which affect the outcome negatively. One could interpret that using cash then should improve the 
probability of takeover success.            
Other determinants 
In addition to the before mentioned main determinants of takeover success, there is some other 
less studied factors which affect or can be used to evaluate the probability of a successful 
takeover. 
Hoffmeister and Dyl (1990) found target market size to be one negatively contributing factor to 
the probability of success. The same negative relationship is confirmed by Raad and Ryan 
(1995). They also find that target companies can defend against takeovers by increasing their 
leverage ratio. 
Termination fees have also found to be effective in increasing the probability of success. 
Termination fee is essentially a fine for dissolving the tender offer agreement. The target usually 
pays the bidder a fixed fee if the deal fails or the target withdraws (Betton et al. 2009). Flanagan 
et al. (1998) observe that the presence of a target termination fee increases the success rate of 
takeovers. 
Cotter et al. (1997) examine the role of the board of directors and independent board members 
during takeover attempts by tender offer. The target shareholders receive a better price for their 
shares when the target board is independent and resistance is used for the gain of shareholders 
rather than because of entrenchment. On the other hand, the board composition is not a 
significant determinant of the outcome. The same result is reported with UK data by O’Sullivan 
and Wong (1998). Board composition and the presence of large external ownership do not 
influence the outcome of the bid.  
The industry position and the nationality of the target and the bidder could influence the outcome 
of the proposed takeover. Antitrust legislation can prevent an acquisition on an industry where 
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the acquirer would gain too dominant a position if the acquisition succeeded. Contrary to this 
Flanagan et al. (1998) report a lower probability of success for diversifying acquisitions. These 
restrictions, in addition with growth prospects, force companies to expand beyond the borders of 
their domicile. This leads to cross-border acquisitions which might face trouble because of 
factors such as patriotism and protectionism which lead to government intervention in cross-
border acquisitions. This kind of behavior has been documented in Europe with data from 1997 
to 2006 in the working paper by Dinc and Erel (2010). Flanagan et al. (1998) report a higher 
probability of success for cross-border bids for US based companies. This could be because of 
the high level of sophistication and concentration of the US market.    
Another approach to predicting the success of takeovers is presented by Samuelson and 
Rosenthal (1986). They take market prices as the most efficient indicators of takeover success 
and use the movement of target share price and the spread between the current share price and the 
offer price during the offer period as a determinant of the outcome of the offer. The lower the 
spread is, the higher is the probability of the takeover succeeding. This method is used especially 
with the trading strategy called merger arbitrage where profits are generated through betting on 
the success of an acquisition and exploiting the spread between the market price after the 
acquisition announcement and the offer price (Brown and Raymond, 1986; Baker and Savasoglu, 
2002). The reason why I haven’t discussed this method in higher detail is because of the 
difference in the time period when the prediction happens. Share prices can predict takeover 
success only during the offer period whereas I have focused on the factors that contribute already 
on the pre-announcement period.   
2.4 Corporate Governance and Investor Protection 
Although the outcome of tender offers and the effects of single factors affecting the outcome 
have been quite well studied in the past literature, the studies have focused on the most developed 
markets, mainly to the US but also to UK to some extent. No study has examined tender offers 
from a global perspective and the effect of different corporate governance systems and the 
resulting differing level of investor protection to the outcome of the offer in cross-border 
situations. Rossi and Volpin (2004) have already proved that investor protection is an important 
determinant of the M&A activity around the world.   
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A tender offer is an offer directly made to the target shareholders, so only the decision of the 
shareholders to tender or not should affect the outcome. But we have already seen that 
management can have a high influence on the outcome if they decide to resist the offer. And 
managers can resist because they think that the offer is insufficient or because of agency 
problems; they do not want to lose the control over the company. Control over a company can 
provide private benefits for the management. The value of private benefits is determined by the 
level of governance and investor protection in place (La Porta et al., 2000). The value of private 
benefits should vary according to the level of investor protection in each country.    
Now, I first review the most common mechanisms of corporate governance observed to be in 
place around the world. Then I revise the different legal systems adopted by worldwide and 
finally present the effects of differing level of investor protection to acquisitions. 
Different mechanisms of corporate governance 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have written an extensive survey about the different corporate 
governance mechanisms and describe those in high detail. This part of this section focuses on 
their paper. 
Shleifer and Vishny take a simple agency perspective on corporate governance. Agency problems 
are the reason why governance is required; if suppliers of capital (debt and equity) were certain 
that managers would pay them the return required without question, no governance would be 
needed. But, managers (and large shareholders) might be place their own interests above all else. 
Governance structures are required to prevent this expropriation of suppliers of capital and 
minority shareholders. 
Legal protection of share and debt holders is the most obvious method of corporate governance. 
Different legal systems, which I will go through later, provide different quality of protection. 
Most common rights for shareholders should include right to own shares and the company 
recognizes the ownership, vote on important corporate matters, minority rights such as minority 
dividend and above all else all shareholders should be treated equally. Debt holder protection 
include the right to grab assets serving as collateral, demand the liquidation of the company, vote 
on the restructuring and remove managers in the restructuring process if the company is unable to 
serve its debt. One important aspect of determining the level of legal protection in addition to 
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laws in place is the willingness of courts to enforce these rights. La Porta et al. (1998) were the 
first provide useful indices of shareholder and creditor protection for 49 countries in their paper. 
These indices have been corrected later on by Spamann (2010) for shareholder rights and by 
Djankov et al. (2007) for creditor rights.    
Large shareholders (large minority or controlling owners) have an important monitoring duty 
over the managers if the legal protection is unable to monitor managers properly. Large 
shareholders have an incentive to monitor managers as they have substantial amount of wealth 
tied into the company. However, even if large shareholders can alleviate the expropriation 
problem of managers they might expropriate minority shareholders themselves. Also, a drawback 
of large shareholders is that they might be more risk-averse than normal as the large shareholding 
in a single company prevents efficient diversification of their holdings. Large shareholders are 
more common in countries with less developed legal systems and the degree of ownership 
required to be an efficient monitor is inversely related to the development of the legal system.  
Large debt holders may also act as efficient monitors of management and are common in 
Germany and Japan where banks have a major role in financing companies. 
Other mechanisms include takeovers in the most developed markets such as the US and UK. 
Also, debt has a control effect on managers as they must concentrate on serving the debt to 
prevent bankruptcy. LBOs, again mostly observed in the most developed markets, combine many 
features alleviating agency problems by providing better aligned incentives to managers and 
using high amounts of debt to control them from using cash inefficiently. 
Traditionally corporate governance has been divided into according to market and bank financed 
countries (La Porta et al., 2000). However, there are problems with this kind of classification. For 
example Japan has been considered as a bank centered country but it still has a quite large and 
widely owned equity market. Also, French civil law countries have both, undeveloped credit and 
equity markets, so it would be wrong to classify them as bank centered economies. Other way 
could be classifying countries according their adoption of Glass-Steagal like regulation affecting 
the ability of banks to hold equity stakes in industrial companies. These classifications have not 
been found to be significant in explaining the ownership structures detected across the world (La 
Porta et al., 1999a). 
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Different legal systems 
Now that I have gone through the basic mechanisms of corporate governance, I continue to 
explain differences between different systems. La Porta et al. (1998) study the legal matters 
protecting investors in 49 countries and divide the legal systems into four major categories: 
English, German, French and Scandinavian. Different legal codes have evolved through history 
and have been passed from country to country by colonialism.  
French, German and Scandinavian legal systems constitute the civil law family originating from 
Roman law which relies on legal scholars on the development and interpretation of laws. The 
French law was written under the rule of Napoleon and brought to Belgium, the Netherlands, part 
of Poland, Italy and Western regions of Germany by his armies. Later on the French law 
extended its reach to Near East, Northern parts of Africa, Indochina, Oceania and parts of the 
Caribbean. Other areas influenced include Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy and parts of 
Switzerland. Also Latin American laws are based on the French law. The German legal code also 
dates back to the 19
th
 century but is not as widely adopted as the French one due to lesser amount 
of colonies. Countries affected by it include Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan and Korea, China and Taiwan. Scandinavian law is in place in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. (La Porta et al., 1998).  
English common law is formed by judges and their decisions instead of scholars. It is in place in 
the United Kingdom and adopted by its colonies such as United States, Canada, Australia, India 
and others. The major differences between the common and civil law systems are in the 
development of the system. Common law develops case by case as each court ruling may affect 
the next, while civil law develops through research. One may interpret that the development of 
common law is much faster and the legal rules are much more up-to-date than in civil law 
systems. (La Porta et al., 1998).       
Consequences of the different legal systems 
La Porta el al. (1998), find that investor protection varies greatly under different systems, investor 
are best protected under the English system while the French legal system provides the worst 
level of protection. German and Scandinavian countries fall in between. Laws are enforced best 
in Scandinavian and German civil law countries, then in English common law countries and 
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enforcement is worst in French common law countries. French civil law countries are found to be 
worst in protecting the investors regardless of income levels. However, enforcing laws improves 
with higher income level.  
The most direct consequence of the various legal systems and the following difference in investor 
protection is the level of ownership concentration perceived under each system (La Porta et al., 
1998). Overall, ownership concentration is found to be very high around the world, only the most 
developed English law countries have dispersed company ownership structures (La Porta et al., 
1998). La Porta et al. (1999a) find that taking large and medium-sized companies into 
consideration only companies in the US and UK can be considered widely held. Other factor 
besides ownership structure, affected by the legal system and thus the level of investor protection 
is the development of capital markets. La Porta et al. (1997)  present evidence that countries with 
worse investor protection have generally less developed and smaller capital markets (both debt 
and equity). In addition to finance, the legal system also affects the quality of government 
performance (La Porta et al., 1999b). 
Critique against legal system based division of corporate governance 
Lately, there has been critique against the findings of La Porta et al. (1997; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; 
2000) as they utilize the same dataset in all their studies and their finding hold on country-level 
but not on firm-level investigation. They are also criticized of focusing only a few very large 
firms and making generalizations out of those results (Holderness, 2009).  
Spamann (2010) revises the antidirector rights index, used by La Porta et al. in their studies, by a 
questionnaire made to lawyers in all the countries included and provides corrections for 33 of the 
49 countries included and finds that the correlation between the old and corrected index is only 
0.53. He also proves many of the findings of La Porta et al. false with the corrected index. He 
finds no relation between legal system and shareholder protection, ownership concentration or 
stock market size, results which had been long taken for granted.  
Holderness (2008 and 2009) investigates the effect of legal systems to ownership concentration 
globally and in the US in his papers. He concentrates on firm-level data instead of country-level 
averages used by for example La Porta et al. He finds no evidence globally of any relation 
between investor protection and ownership concentration. He also discards the widely-held US 
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companies as a myth. The ownership concentration in the US is similar than elsewhere. Japan 
and UK are found to be countries with most diffuse equity ownership in companies. Franks et al. 
(2009) study the evolution of equity markets and ownership concentration in UK companies. 
They find that the UK already had an active equity market and high dispersion of ownership even 
before it was regulated, so investor protection cannot be the reason for the dispersion. They 
observe the same development in Germany and Japan with the distinction of lesser takeover 
activity.  
In the light of the recent critique against the approach of La Porta et al. in studying the effects of 
investor protection and different legal systems it seems that the best approach is to use firm-level 
estimates and to avoid making assumptions based directly on legal systems. Using country-
specific measures of investor protection is a better way according to the recent research. But it 
cannot be denied that legal systems differ and that countries under certain legal family share 
some common characteristics.     
Investor protection and acquisitions 
Several papers during the 2000s have examined the effects of cross-border M&A, taking both 
mergers and tender offers into consideration, to synergies gained from the acquisitions and how 
the synergies related to the difference of investor protection between the target and the bidder.  
Rossi and Volpin (2004), who base their study on the indices of investor protection, constructed 
by La Porta et al. (1998), present a hypothesis that investor protection weakens the barriers to the 
market for corporate control. Targets in countries with low level of protection, and thus the 
highest level of expropriation, can gain the most from the transfer of control to a more efficient 
owner. They report higher M&A volume, premiums paid and amount of hostile deals in countries 
with better investor protection. Also, Rossi and Volpin state that cash deals are favored under less 
developed systems as stock deals require an environment with high investor protection. 
Bris and Cabolis (2008a and 2008b) have written two papers about the importance of corporate 
governance in cross-border acquisitions. The level of corporate governance was measured with 
four criteria: shareholder protection, creditor protection, accounting standards and the level of 
corruption. They relate the resulting positive returns of cross-border acquisitions with better 
monitoring leading to a decrease in agency problems and expropriation in the target (Bris and 
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Cabolis, 2008b).  Their first paper (2008a) deals with over 500 cross-border acquisitions, where 
100% of target shares were acquired, in 39 countries between 1989 and 2002. They find that the 
announcement effect (synergies) were higher for a cross-border acquisition in which the target 
was in a country with worse shareholder protection than the acquirer than for a matching 
domestic acquisition. Takeover premiums increase with the level of investor protection of the 
bidder country and decrease with the level of the target country. This makes sense as there is less 
hidden value to be found in well governed targets. The second paper of Bris and Cabolis (2008b) 
supports their previous results but with industry-level data. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) conducted a similar study in Europe. Instead of using the 
generic indices of corporate governance by La Porta et al. (1998), they construct their own, more 
sophisticated indices of shareholder, minority and creditor protection. But, their results are in line 
with Bris and Cabolis (2008a and 2008b) and they conclude that differences in corporate 
governance between the bidder and the target have an impact on the takeover returns. They also 
prove that the positive impact holds also for partial takeovers and not only for acquisitions of all 
target shares. Wang and Xie (2009) prove the theory of governance transfer valid and its positive 
effects to the value of the parties involved through acquisitions by examining domestic takeovers 
in the US and the firm-level differences in governance practices.    
The level of investor protection and corporate governance overall seems to have a clear effect on 
the value of targets and synergies realized from through acquisitions. Higher announcement 
effects imply higher synergies in acquisitions where the investor protection in the country of the 
target is lesser than in the country of the bidder. The “hidden” value of these companies is 
explained by agency problems. The lower the level of investor protection is the higher are the 
agency problems, expropriation of shareholders by managers and large shareholders and thus the 
private benefits of control which all decrease the overall value of the company.                                           
3 HYPOTHESES 
This section presents the hypotheses of this thesis. The hypotheses are derived from the academic 
literature reviewed in the previous section. I divide the hypotheses into two classes: deal and 
country specific. Deal specific hypotheses include the hypotheses about the traditional 
determinants of tender offer outcome as well as the new behavioral determinant, the effect of 
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anchoring the offer premium to the 52-week high price of the target. Country specific hypotheses 
relate to the differences in investor protection between different countries and on the effects of 
these differences to the outcome of the offer.  
3.1 Deal Specific 
The first thing generally published anywhere about a corporate acquisition is the premium offered 
over the current share price for the shareholders of the target company. It is an important factor to 
the shareholders and has an impact whether to tender to shares or not. General economic theory 
and theoretical studies about the subject are clear that a higher premium should increase the 
probability of shareholders accepting the offer and the offer being successful (Hirsleifer and 
Titman, 1990). Some empirical studies have found premium significant (Walkling, 1985) while 
others have found no significance (Hoffmeister and Dyl, 1981) but Walkling argued that it might 
be because of misspecification of the premium.  
H1. Tender offer premium is a factor affecting the probability of tender offer 
success. The relationship between premium offered and the probability of 
success is positive.   
One reason for the uncertainty about the importance of the bid premium is due to investor 
psychology. The size might not matter as much as exceeding a certain psychological boundary. 
The price offered is compared to certain reference points which investors mentally use to 
benchmark their gains and losses (Kahneman, 1992). Baker et al. (2009), report that one common 
reference point in evaluating the selling decision in acquisitions is the 52-week high price which 
is widely reported in financial press. They find that offer prices are biased towards the 52-week 
high and that offers where premium exceeds the 52-week high are more likely to succeed. 
H2. Tender offer price higher than the target 52-week high price is a factor 
affecting the probability of tender offer success. The relationship between the 
offer price exceeding the 52-week high and the probability of success is positive. 
Target management resistance is widely reported to have a negative impact on the probability of 
success. Target management might resist as they think the offer to be too low or because they are 
afraid of losing their jobs and private benefits of running the company (Baron, 1983; Schwert, 
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2000). Empirical studies (Walkling 1985; Baker at al. 2009) have generally found a negative 
relation between target management resistance and the probability of deal success. 
H3. Target management resistance is a factor affecting the probability of tender 
offer success. The relationship between target management resistance and the 
probability of success is negative.   
Pre-bid ownership i.e. a toehold in the target company has been proven to significantly contribute 
to the success of a tender offer both in theory (Hirsleifer and Titman 1990; Bulow et al. 1999) 
and in empirical studies (Walking, 1985). However, only a small minority of companies is 
buying a toehold before tender offers and mostly toeholds are associated with hostile bidders 
(Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Betton et al. 2009).  
H4. Toehold is a factor affecting the probability of tender offer success. The 
relationship between toehold and the probability of success is positive.   
Competing bids are an attribute associated with tender offers. Competition might arise if target 
management resists the bid and invites a favored acquirer, a white knight to bid for the target 
(Schwert, 2000) or as the initial bid reveals positive information about the value of the target 
(Fishman, 1988). Flanagan et al. (1998) report that competition bids have a negative effect on the 
probability of tender offer succeeding. 
H5. Competition among bidders is factor affecting the probability of tender offer 
success. The relationship between competition and the probability of success is 
negative.   
The method of payment in acquisitions is generally cash, stock or the combination of these two. 
Using cash is more common in tender offers. Valuing a cash offer is simpler for the target 
shareholders than a stock offer as stock is more likely to be used as a method of payment by 
acquirers who are overvalued by the market (Hansen, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).  
H6. The method of payment is a factor affecting the probability of tender offer 
success. The relationship between using cash and the probability of success is 
positive.   
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The size of the deal can influence the final outcome of the offer. Deals targeting large targets are 
more complex than smaller ones and the amount of shareholders is higher. These factors affect 
tender offers. Both Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) & Raad and Ryan (1995) that target size has a 
negative effect on the outcome of the offer. 
H7. Target firm size is a factor affecting the probability of tender offer success. 
The relationship between target firm size and the probability of success is 
negative.   
Deal specifics can include termination fees in which the target has to pay a fine to the bidder if the 
deal fails or the target withdraws. The inclusion and the effect of these fees in tender offers is a 
subject which has been less studied in the literature. Flanagan et al. (1998), report that the 
inclusion of termination fees increases the probability of deal success. 
H8. Termination fees are a factor affecting the probability of tender offer 
success. The relationship between termination fees and the probability of 
success is positive. 
Other factors which could also explain the outcome of the offer, but are no formal hypothesis is 
presented are used as control variables. These include financial buyer (LBO), cross-industry and 
cross-country status. On the other hand LBOs provide a possibility of highly lucrative 
compensation for managers but are also associated with heavy restructuring activity. Antitrust 
issues may block acquisitions in a specific industry. Cross-border deals tend to be more complex 
due to differences in corporate cultures. Even such factors as patriotism and protectionism by 
target country government may affect the outcome of the deal. 
3.2 Country Specific  
We have already learned from the existing literature that the outcome of the tender offer is not 
always rationally decided, but agency problems may also play a role in determining the outcome. 
Because of that, agency perspective is also a natural way to go in searching the proper hypothesis 
for country level differences affecting the outcome of a tender offer.  
Papers about cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Bris and Cabolis 2008a, 2008b; Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008) which affect the level of investor protection either in the target or in the 
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acquirer (a corporate governance transfer occurs) have found that investor protection enhancing 
transactions enjoy higher announcement returns than comparable transactions without any 
corporate governance transfer. The authors of the previous papers tie the higher returns to 
improvements in monitoring the management leading to fewer agency problems and less severe 
expropriation of share and debt holders. It also implies that management enjoys high private 
benefits of control in countries with low level of investor protection. As already proven by Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) countries with more developed systems will have a higher amount of LBOs, 
hostile takeover attempts and tender offers overall which all are identified as devices of market 
discipline for poorly performing companies. This tells a story about high control over the company 
exercised by the management in less transparent systems of corporate control, and that deals have 
to be privately negotiated beforehand to be successful in countries which provide lesser protection 
for investors.  
High value of private benefits in less developed corporate governance systems imply that 
managers will do everything to stay in control in order to preserve these benefits. A change in the 
control of the company, which would improve the level of investor protection of the target 
company, and decrease the value of private benefits of the target management, will encounter 
resistance. And from this perspective I derive my hypothesis about cross-border tender offers 
improving the level of investor protection.  
H9. The difference between the level of investor protection in the bidder and 
target country is a factor affecting the outcome of the offer. The effect of an offer 
improving investor protection, where the bidder country has a higher level of 
protection relative to the target country, on the probability of success is 
negative. 
I measure investor protection in a country with the two major classes defined by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997): investor and shareholder protection. The level of corruption is used as well, as 
the level of corruption in a country has a clear relation to the value of private benefits that 
control can provide. Accounting standards are used in the papers by Rossi and Volpin (2004), 
Bris and Cabolis (2008a and 2008b) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) but they either use 
the index created by La Porta et al. (1998) or have constructed indices of their own. As the index 
created by La Porta et al (1998) ranks the accounting standards of a country by the level of 1990, 
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I will not use this index as it might not be the best fit for my dataset ranging from 1986 to 2010. 
During this time the accounting standards have taken leaps forward with the adoption of IFRS 
standards and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation to mention a few improvements in the international 
accounting environment.  
3.3 Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses used in this thesis and the expected effects of the hypotheses are summarized in 
this part. 
Table 1: Hypotheses of the study 
 
 
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section I explain the data collection process, describe the samples used, go through the 
logit regression method used as the research method to examine the factors affecting the outcome 
of tender offers and the probability of success as well as describe the variables used in the 
regression model. Descriptive statistics of the samples are included at the end of this section.  
Hypothesis
H1 The size of the tender offer premium increases the probability of success.
H2 Tender offer premium higher than the target 52-week high price increases  
the probability of success.
H3 Target management resistance decreases the probability of success.
H4 The size of the toehold held by the bidder in the target increases 
the probability of success.
H5 Competition among bidders decreases the probability of success.
H6 The proportion of cash used as the method of payment increases
 the probability of success.
H7 The size of the target firm decreases the probability of success.
H8 Inclusion of a termination fee increases the probability of success.
H9 Difference in the level of investor protection between target and 
acquirer countries decreases the probability of success.
+
-
+
-
+
-
Expected sign
+
+
-
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4.1 Data Collection and Samples  
The data about tender offers is collected from SDC Platinum from all continents around the 
world. The criteria for the data to be included in the dataset was that the acquisition type is a 
tender offer, the acquirer is seeking to own at least a majority stake (over 50%) in the target if the 
acquisition is successful, the offer is clearly completed or withdrawn, the target is a publicly 
listed company and the minimum deal size is $US 50 million. The last two parameters were to 
ensure that sufficient data about the deal would be available, as the disclosure tends to be worse 
in smaller, private deals. Acquirer public status was not required as I wanted to include LBOs in 
the sample, and companies executing LBOs are mainly private investment companies. Stock 
price data for the 52-week high prices for the target prior to the announcement of the tender offer 
were taken from SDC when available and supplementary data for the missing values is gathered 
from Thomson ONE Banker.     
Initial sample 
The initial sample consisted of 5591 tender offers with targets from 73 countries announced 
during the time period spanning from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 2010. Events were 
removed from the sample mainly because of lacking stock price and offer premium data, or 
because of unknown method of payment.   
Final sample 
The final sample consists of 3783 tender offer announcements, of which 1406 are cross-border 
deals, made during January 30, 1986 and December 23, 2010 from 38 countries. This dataset is 
complete for all variables except the comparison of offer premium to target 52-week high stock 
price prior the announcement. Complete data also for this variable is retrieved for 1854 events, of 
which 620 are cross-border deals. Description of the dataset is given later in this section.   
The main reason for the missing stock price data was the lack of company identifiers (CUSIP, 
Sedol or ticker) for target companies retrieved from SDC. The stock price data was either not 
available or could not be found with the identifiers at hand. Another important factor for 
eliminating events from the dataset is that the antidirector rights index (Spamann, 2010) is 
available only for 46 countries.  
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4.2 Logit Regression 
This part explains the statistical methods used in this thesis. Studies about tender offer success 
have used several methods in determining the outcome and the determinants affecting the 
outcome of the tender offer. Older studies such as Quirin (1971), Pelligrino (1972), Ebeid (1974) 
and Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) all use multivariate linear regression analysis. However, 
Walkling (1985) presented points for using logistic regression instead of linear one, as linear 
models have some weaknesses when evaluating variables and outcomes which take a value 
between 0 and 1. As the prediction of tender offer outcome takes a binary form, the logit model 
should be a potent tool for analyzing the outcomes of tender offers.  
The theory behind logistic regression can be found for example from Cramer (1991) or 
Dougherty (2007). In addition to these two books, Press and Wilson (1978) present a comparison 
between logistic regression and discriminant analysis in their paper. Based on the Dougherty’s 
book I go through the assumptions behind the model and present the idea how estimation using a 
logit regression model is conducted and how the model can be evaluated. 
The logit model is a binary choice model where the outcome of an event is assigned a value, 1 if 
the event occurs and 0 if the event does not occur.  
Predicted probabilities from traditional linear regression models can violate meaningful zero-one 
boundaries. In other words, the predicted probability can be higher than 1 or less than 0 for 
extreme values of the independent variables. Also, the use of linear model with a binary 
dependent variable can cause heteroskedasticity as the distribution of the error term consists only 
of two values, 0 and 1. The problem with heteroskedasticity is dealt with by fitting the model 
with a technique called maximum likelihood estimation instead of least squares.  
The problem with irrelevant probabilities is solved by first defining a variable Z that is a linear 
function of the explanatory (independent) variables:   
                         
Then, probability p is a sigmoid (S-shaped) function of Z. Below and above certain values; at the 
extreme ends of the curve small changes in independent variables are unlikely to affect the total 
outcome. In between these values the probability is sensitive to the value of Z. One popular 
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mathematical form for the function is the logistic function, used in the logit model and the other 
is cumulative normal distribution which is utilized by the probit model. Both models should give 
quite satisfactory and similar results. 
In the logit model the probability of the occurrence of the event is determined as 
          
 
      
     
The boundaries for p are defined as following. When Z tends to infinity, e
-Z
 tends to 0 and p has a 
limiting upper bound of 1. As Z tends to minus infinity, e
-Z 
tends to infinity and p has a limiting 
lower bound of 0. 
The marginal effect of Z on the probability p, which will be denoted f (Z), is the derivative of this 
function with the respect to Z:  
       
  
  
  
   
        
 
The model is fitted by using maximum likelihood estimation. The method uses an iterative 
process to estimate the parameters. It is used in cases where the assumptions for using OLS 
estimators not satisfied. Maximum likelihood estimation should yield estimators which are 
consistent but also efficient in large samples. I will not go further into the details of this 
estimation technique but the detailed proof of the power of the method can be found from 
Dougherty (2007).  
Fit and evaluation of the logit model 
The fit of the model in regular linear regression is measured with the R
2
 measure. However, there 
is no equivalent measure of fit in maximum likelihood estimation. 
The R
2
 measure used with logistic regression is called the pseudo-R
2
. The pseudo-R
2
 compares 
the log-likelihood of the model with the log-likelihood of a model including only the intercept. 
Contrary to the conventional R
2
 it does not have a clear interpretation according to its value. 
Nevertheless, some pseudo-R
2 
measures have been developed to predict the fit of the model. One 
of these measures is the generalized R
2
 proposed by Nagelkerke (1991)
 
who transforms the 
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measure in such a way that it takes values from 0 to 1, a value of zero implying a poor fit and 
value of one predicts a good fit of the model.  
The other measures of fit used include the number of outcomes predicted correctly. In this 
approach, denoting the actual outcome in observation i as Yi with Yi = 1 if the event occurs and 0 
if it does not, and the probability of the event occurring as pi, the observation i is taken as 1 if pi 
greater than 0.5 and 0 if it is less. 
The standard significance tests are similar to the standard regression models. The significance of 
an individual coefficient can be evaluated via its t statistic. However, the standard error is only 
valid in large samples, but the same applies to the t distribution, which converges on the normal 
distribution in large samples. 
4.3 Definition of Variables 
The variables used in the regression analysis are defined and described in this part. They are 
derived from the hypotheses of this study described before. A few additional variables are used as 
control variables. First, I define the dependent variable and then the deal and country specific 
independent variables used. 
Dependent variable 
Offer success is the dependent variable used in the regression analysis. It is a binary variable and 
assigned a value of 1 if the tender offer was successful and the value of 0 if the tender offer 
failed. A tender offer is defined successful if it is defined as completed by SDC. A tender offer is 
defined failed is it is defined as withdrawn by SDC. Only offers marked clearly completed or 
withdrawn were taken into account when selecting the sample.   
Independent variables – Deal specific 
Target attitude is a binary variable indicating the reaction of the target 
management to the offer. It is assigned a value of 1 if the offer is classified as 
hostile or unsolicited by SDC. Friendly, neutral or other offers are assigned a 
value of 0. 
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Competition is a binary variable assigned a value of 1 if the offer is competed 
i.e. there are more than one bidder. If there is only one offer made for the target 
shareholders the variable is assigned a value of 0. 
Three different variables for the offer premium are introduced next. I have included three 
different variables for the offer premium as Walkling (1985) notes that the premium is affected 
by rumors already before the announcement of the offer. Schwert (1996) confirms that takeover 
announcements are preceded by a “run-up” in the target stock price. However, only one measure 
for premium is used in the final analysis after defining which measure for the premium provides 
the best fit. The premium data is collected from SDC. 
Premium 1 day measures the premium offered, in percentage terms, for the 
target shareholders, relative to the closing price of the target the day before the 
announcement of the tender offer. The variable is continuous.  
Premium 1 week measures the premium offered, in percentage terms, for the 
target shareholders, relative to the closing price of the target one week before the 
announcement of the tender offer. The variable is continuous. 
Premium 4 weeks measures the premium offered, in percentage terms, for the 
target, relative to the closing price of the target four weeks before the 
announcement of the tender offer. The variable is continuous.  
One other variable is also linked to the premium offered, and relates to the psychology associated 
with the offer premium. It is the measure used by Baker et al. (2009) whether the offer price 
exceeds the 52-week high stock price of the target. I decided to use this measure instead of the 
relative compensation used by Elsland and Weber (2006) because of its simplicity and the clearer 
anchoring effect into a single reference point. The 52-week premium is measured for the prior 
52- week period beginning 30 days before the announcement. The data for the 52-week high 
prices is collected from SDC when available and supplemented with data from Thomson ONE 
Banker. 
Premium over 52-week high is a binary variable assigned a value of 1 if the offer 
price exceeds the target 52-week high stock price and a value of 0 if it does not.  
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The bidder’s pre-announcement ownership e.g. toehold in the target is measured with the same 
method as Betton et al. (2009). They classify missing toeholds as having a zero percent toehold. 
This method seems valid as the data is missing mainly for withdrawn offers and it is reasonable to 
assume that they did not hold any shares in the target.  
Toehold is a continuous variable. It measures the percentage of target shares 
held by the bidder prior the announcement of the offer. The toehold is calculated 
by subtracting the amount of shares acquired in the offer from the amount of 
shares owned by the bidder after the completion of the offer.   
The method of payment is also measured with multiple variables. First, only the method used is 
classified to be cash or something else. The second approach is to use the exact percentage of cash 
used in the payment structure, so it is more a more sophisticated measure of the payment structure. 
Again, as with the premium, only one of these variables is used in the final analysis. 
Method of payment is a binary variable assigned a value of 1 if the payment 
method in the offer is classified to be “Cash Only” in SDC. If there is only one 
offer made for the target shareholders the variable is assigned a value of 0. 
Percentage of cash is a continuous variable measuring the proportion of cash in 
percentage terms in the payment structure of the offer.  
Target size is used as the general measure of the size of the offer. It is measured by the market 
capitalization or equity value of the target retrieved from SDC.  
Target size is the natural logarithm of the target market (equity) value denoted in 
millions of US dollars four weeks prior the announcement of the offer. The 
variable is continuous. 
Termination fee is a fine paid by the target to the bidder if the target withdraws. The data for 
termination fees is collected from SDC. 
Termination fee is a binary variable. It is assigned a value of 1 if it is indicated in 
SDC that the target is required to pay a termination fee if the offer fails. 
Otherwise it is assigned a value of 0. 
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Several control variables are used in addition to the previously mentioned ones. These include 
cross-border and cross-industry status, type of buyer and the year of the offer. These are variables 
that do not have their own hypothesis but may affect the outcome of the offer.  
Cross-border offer is a binary variable. It is assigned a value of 1 if SDC has 
classified the deal as a cross-border deal and the target and bidder nations differ 
and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Cross-industry offer is a binary variable. It is assigned a value of 1 if the two-
digit SIC codes of the target and the bidder differ and a value of 0 otherwise.  
Financial buyer is a binary variable. It is assigned a value of 1 if SDC has 
classified the offer as an LBO and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Year is a binary variable and each year between 1986 and 2010 is assigned its 
own dummy variable. The value of 1 represents the year the offer is announced. 
As acquisition activity follows the cycles it is important to take out the year 
effects which might affect the results. 
Independent variables – Country specific  
Now I define the country specific variables acting as the measure of investor protection in each 
country. These are used in the analysis of cross-border tender offers. They show how high the 
influence of shareholders and creditors is in individual countries. I use indices created previously 
by scholars to measure the level of corporate governance in individual countries.  
Shareholder protection is measured by the antidirector rights index originally created by La Porta 
et al. (1998) but revised and corrected by Spamann (2010). The corrected index measures the 
level of shareholder protection as a sum of six factors: proxy voting by mail allowed, shares not 
blocked before the annual general meeting, cumulative voting allowed, oppressed minorities 
mechanism in place, preemptive rights to new issues and percentage of share capital required to 
call an extraordinary shareholder’s meeting. . Index data is retrieved from Spamann’s web page1. 
                                                 
 
1
 Holger Spamann’s publications - http://www.spamann.net/ 
50 
 
The data package also contains a detailed explanation of the process how the index is 
constructed.     
Target shareholder protection is a continuous variable. The target is assigned a 
value ranging from 0 to 6 according to how many shareholder rights are in place 
in the target country.  
Acquirer shareholder protection is a continuous variable. The acquirer is 
assigned a value ranging from 0 to 6 according to how many shareholder rights 
are in place in the bidder country.  
Creditor protection is measured with the index presented in the paper of Djankov et al. (2007). 
The index constitutes of the following creditor rights measured separately for each year from 1978 
to 2003: creditor consent in reorganization, the ability of secured creditors to seize their collateral 
after the petition for reorganization, whether secured creditors are paid first in liquidation and 
whether an administrator is responsible for running the firm during reorganization. The index is 
used as a general measure of creditor power in a country. The data for the index is retrieved from 
Shleifer’s web page2. 
Target creditor protection is a continuous variable. The target is assigned a 
value ranging from 0 to 4 according to how many creditor rights are in place in 
the target country.  
Acquirer creditor protection is a continuous variable. The acquirer is assigned a 
value ranging from 0 to 4 according to how many creditor rights are in place in 
the bidder country.  
Both shareholder and creditor rights indices are multiplied by the “Rule of Law” measure 
corresponding to the announcement year (scale transformed from -2.5 to 2.5 to a range of 0 to 1) 
provided by the World Bank
3
, which indicates the level of law enforcement in a country. This 
                                                 
 
2
 Professor Andrei Shleifer’s Data Sets - http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
3
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project - http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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gives a more realistic picture of the true level of rights the investors have in a specific country. 
Enforcement of laws is also noted as one of the key factors of successful corporate governance by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
These variables are used independently but also the difference between them is measured and 
used separately in regressions as for example (Bris and Cabolis 2008a; 2008b) have done. 
Difference: shareholder protection is a continuous variable. It is formed by 
deducting the target shareholder protection score from the bidder shareholder 
protection score.  
Difference: creditor protection is a continuous variable. It is formed by 
deducting the target creditor protection score from the creditor protection score. 
The level of corruption, also retrieved from the World Bank database
3
, and scaled to range from 
0 to 5 in the target and acquirer country is used as a control variable. 
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Variable Type Definition
Offer success Binary Dependent variable: offer completed (1) or withdrawn (0)
Target attitude Binary Reaction of the target management: hostile (1) or other (0)
Competition Binary Multiple bidders (1) or single bidder (0)
Premium 1 day Continuous Offer price compared to the closing price one day prior 
the announcement
Premium 1 week Continuous Offer price compared to the closing price one week prior
the announcement
Premium 4 weeks Continuous Offer price compared to the closing price four weeks prior 
the announcement
Premium over Continuous Offer price exceeds the target 52 week high (1) or does
52 week high not exceed (0)
Toehold Continuous The percentage of target shares held by the bidder prior
to the announcement of the bid
Method of payment Binary Cash (1) or other (0)
Percentage of cash Continuous The percentage of cash used in the total consideration 
Target size Continuous Natural logarithm of the target equity value in USDm  
measured 4 weeks prior the announcement of the bid
Termination fee Binary Whether termination fee included (1) or not (0)
Target shareholder Continuous The value of the shareholder rights index in the target country
protection (between 0 and 6)
Acquirer shareholder Continuous The value of the shareholder rights index in the bidder country
protection (between 0 and 6)
Target creditor Continuous The value of the creditor rights index in the target country
protection (between 0 and 4)
Acquirer creditor Continuous The value of the creditor rights index in the bidder country
protection (between 0 and 4)
Difference: Shareholder Continuous Difference between the shareholder rights index value in the 
protection bidder and target country
Difference: Creditor Continuous Difference between the creditor rights index value in the 
protection bidder and target country
Cross-border Binary Whether the offer is flagged as a cross-border deal (1) 
deal by SDC or not (0)
Cross-industry Binary Whether the two-digit SIC codes of the target and the bidder
match (0) or do not match (1)
Financial buyer Binary Whether the offer is flagged as an LBO (1) by SDC or not (0)
Year Binary Dummy variables representing each year in the sample
Target corruption Continuous The value of the corruption index in the target country
(between 0 and 5)
Acquirer corruption Continuous The value of the corruption index in the bidder country
(between 0 and 5)
Difference: Corruption Continuous Difference between the corruption index value in the 
bidder and target country
Main variables
Control variables
Table 2: Summary of variables 
This table summarizes the main and control variables used in the study, their type and definition. 
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics      
This part presents the characteristics of the samples used. I first show statistics about the 
distribution of the full sample by year, country and then summary statistics for the categorical 
and non-categorical variables and for several subsamples. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
tender offers by year and target nation.  
 
I have divided the observations into three groups whether the target is from United States, United 
Kingdom or from some other country. This is done as a major portion of all tender offers occur in 
the US or in the UK as Table 1 shows. As can be interpret Figure 1 demonstrates clearly how 
tender offer activity follows the general business cycle. The amount of offers spikes during the 
booms in late 1980s, 1990s and mid-2000s and correspondingly decreases heavily during the 
recessions that have followed. One notable thing is that before year 1990 tender offers are only 
observed in the US and UK. The tender offer activity in rest of the world has caught up with 
these developed markets during the past 15 years. Part of this could be explained by local crises 
such as the bursting of the asset price bubble in Japan in 1990, the Asian and Russian financial 
Figure 1: Distribution of tender offers by year and target nation 
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crises in 1997 and 1998, the bursting of the dot-com bubble affecting the US the most in early 
2000s as well as the recent financial crisis which begun in 2007.        
Table 3 lists the 38 countries included in the dataset, their legal origin and system and the amount 
of tender offers occurred in each country. The number of observations per country is reported 
both by target and acquirer. Over 60% of the target companies are from the US and the UK and 
nearly 60% of all bids are made by companies located in those two countries. 
Although division between legal systems is not a proper way to classify the characteristics of 
individual countries, there is a clear link between the legal system in place in a country and the 
tender offer activity experienced. The distribution of tender offers made to targets in different 
legal systems is shown in Figure 2. Out of the total 3783 offers, 3034 tender offers were made for 
a target residing in a country where English common law is in place. Even though the French 
civil law is the most common legal system among the countries in the sample (adopted by 15 
countries whereas English common law is adopted by 13 countries) the number of tender offers 
made in those countries (284) is less than one tenth of the total number of offers made to 
companies under the English system.  
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of tender offers according to legal system 
English
3034
French
284
German
251
Scandinavian
214
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Countries Legal origin Legal system Target % of total Acquirer % of total
Argentina Civil French 4 0.1 % 3 0.1 %
Australia Common English 275 7.3 % 208 5.5 %
Austria Civil German 5 0.1 % 10 0.3 %
Belgium Civil French 10 0.3 % 26 0.7 %
Brazil Civil French 3 0.1 % 9 0.2 %
Canada Common English 184 4.9 % 185 4.9 %
Chile Civil French 8 0.2 % 2 0.1 %
Denmark Civil Scandinavian 33 0.9 % 24 0.6 %
Egypt Civil French 4 0.1 % 2 0.1 %
Finland Civil Scandinavian 16 0.4 % 17 0.4 %
France Civil French 87 2.3 % 160 4.2 %
Germany Civil German 41 1.1 % 106 2.8 %
Greece Civil French 9 0.2 % 10 0.3 %
Hong Kong Common English 36 1.0 % 56 1.5 %
India Common English 9 0.2 % 14 0.4 %
Ireland-Rep Common English 28 0.7 % 26 0.7 %
Israel Common English 2 0.1 % 5 0.1 %
Italy Civil French 28 0.7 % 51 1.3 %
Japan Civil German 166 4.4 % 194 5.1 %
Malaysia Common English 33 0.9 % 35 0.9 %
Mexico Civil French 6 0.2 % 12 0.3 %
Netherlands Civil French 74 2.0 % 107 2.8 %
New Zealand Common English 20 0.5 % 22 0.6 %
Norway Civil Scandinavian 61 1.6 % 28 0.7 %
Peru Civil French 2 0.1 % 0 0.0 %
Philippines Civil French 1 0.0 % 3 0.1 %
Portugal Civil French 5 0.1 % 5 0.1 %
Singapore Common English 54 1.4 % 44 1.2 %
South Africa Common English 18 0.5 % 25 0.7 %
South Korea Civil German 4 0.1 % 8 0.2 %
Spain Civil French 42 1.1 % 55 1.5 %
Sweden Civil Scandinavian 104 2.7 % 96 2.5 %
Switzerland Civil German 28 0.7 % 69 1.8 %
Taiwan Civil German 7 0.2 % 8 0.2 %
Thailand Common English 8 0.2 % 5 0.1 %
United Kingdom Common English 875 23.1 % 752 19.9 %
United States Common English 1492 39.4 % 1400 37.0 %
Venezuela Civil French 1 0.0 % 1 0.0 %
Total 3783 100 % 3783 100 %
    
Table 3: Distribution of tender offers by target and acquiring country 
This table presents the distribution of tender offers by target and acquiring country and shows the relative amount of 
tender offers in each country. Each country is also classified according their legal origin and system. 
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In addition to US and UK, Australia and Canada are countries with high tender offer activity (275 
and 184 offers respectively). Another interesting finding is that Sweden, although a very small 
country has more tender offers in the sample than for example Germany, France or Spain. This 
could of course be due to the elimination of data from the sample, so there might be a bias 
towards countries which have disclosed information about tender offers in the best way.  
On the other hand, the division could be a signal of two things. First, acquisition activity is 
overall higher in countries which have adopted the English legal system, especially in the US and 
the UK, which are perceived to have the most developed capital markets in the world. Secondly, 
the discrepancy could derive from cultural differences. It could be that in most cultures large 
deals such as acquisitions are preferred to be negotiated in private and generally in friendly terms. 
So, a major part of acquisitions outside the US and the UK might be friendly mergers, negotiated 
between the managements of the companies involved, instead of tender offers directly to the 
shareholders.    
Summary statistics 
Now that I have gone through the composition of the sample according to country and legal 
system I continue to describe the composition of the sample in the light of variables and 
subsamples. Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the categorical variables in different 
samples and subsamples.  
Panel A shows that the failure rate of tender offers in the whole sample is around 15%, a bit 
lower, but quite much in line with the previous studies. For example Fabozzi et al. (1988) report 
17 % of the bids in their sample to be unsuccessful and Flanagan et al. (1998) note that 23% of 
all tender offers reported by SDC were not successful. The slightly smaller failure percentage in 
my sample may be because of the data elimination process. It is more likely that withdrawn offers 
are the ones which have missing data and have been eliminated due to that. Hostile offers and 
offers with multiple bidders have clearly higher failure rates, 55% and 40% respectively. 
Interestingly cross-border offers seem to fail less often as the rate is only 12%. Otherwise it 
seems that offers for targets outside the US and the UK fail more often.  
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Table 4: Tender offer success rate and characteristics of the sample 
The table below lists the full sample and several subsamples and presents their characteristics. The number of 
observations and the percentage of observations falling into each category are reported. Table A covers the full 
sample and Panel B the sample which includes the comparison of the offer premium to the 52-week high price of the 
target prior the announcement.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Full Sample
Sample Observations Successful Failed Hostile Competition Termination Cash only Toehold Cross-border Cross-industry LBO
Full 3783 3232 551 558 700 1066 2671 1116 1406 2137 453
85 % 15 % 15 % 19 % 28 % 71 % 30 % 37 % 56 % 12 %
Hostile 558 253 305 216 30 378 289 172 289 28
45 % 55 % 39 % 5 % 68 % 52 % 31 % 52 % 5 %
Competition 700 419 281 216 152 482 215 255 382 83
60 % 40 % 31 % 22 % 69 % 31 % 36 % 55 % 12 %
Cross-border 1406 1236 170 172 255 378 1100 395 716 87
88 % 12 % 12 % 18 % 27 % 78 % 28 % 51 % 6 %
Target nation
US 1492 1299 193 234 295 848 1299 308 428 835 172
87 % 13 % 16 % 20 % 57 % 87 % 21 % 29 % 56 % 12 %
UK 875 753 122 120 138 97 354 203 366 512 139
86 % 14 % 14 % 16 % 11 % 40 % 23 % 42 % 59 % 16 %
Other 1416 1180 236 204 267 121 1018 605 612 790 142
83 % 17 % 14 % 19 % 9 % 72 % 43 % 43 % 56 % 10 %
Acquirer nation
US 1400 1195 205 223 307 637 1144 305 340 809 192
85 % 15 % 16 % 22 % 46 % 82 % 22 % 24 % 58 % 14 %
UK 752 654 98 100 113 143 351 168 240 450 140
87 % 13 % 13 % 15 % 19 % 47 % 22 % 32 % 60 % 19 %
Other 1631 1383 248 235 280 286 1176 643 826 878 121
85 % 15 % 14 % 17 % 18 % 72 % 39 % 51 % 54 % 7 %
Panel B: Sample with 52 week high as reference point
Full 1854 1541 313 293 351 758 1563 556 620 1070 225
83 % 17 % 16 % 19 % 41 % 84 % 30 % 33 % 58 % 12 %
Premium higher 1122 948 174 176 248 470 960 329 386 641 146
84 % 16 % 16 % 22 % 42 % 86 % 29 % 34 % 57 % 13 %
Premium lower 732 593 139 117 103 288 603 227 234 429 79
81 % 19 % 16 % 14 % 39 % 82 % 31 % 32 % 59 % 11 %
Success rate Observations
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Approximately 15% of the bids in the whole sample are hostile bids. Hostility is most certainly 
linked to multiple bidders as 31% of the competed offers are also hostile. Competition among 
bidders seems more frequent when the bidder is based in the US. 
Termination fees are used mainly with US targets and bidders. Overall, termination fees were 
used in 1066 deals and 848 of those were with US targets. On the other hand buying a toehold in 
the target prior the announcement of the tender offer is more popular with targets and acquirers 
coming from outside the US and UK. It also seems that termination fees are favored by friendly 
bidders, as 28% of all offers but only 5% of hostile deals report a termination fee, but 52% of all 
hostile deals include a toehold. This finding supports the result of Betton et al. (2009) that 
toeholds are mainly used in hostile bids. 
Panel B presents the sample which includes the data for target the target 52-week share price. The 
success rate is three percentage points higher for the deals in which the offer prices exceeds the 
52-week high price than in deals which it does not. Otherwise the composition of the smaller 
sample is quite close to the characteristics of the main sample presented in Panel A.      
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the non-categorical variables. I begin the description 
of the sample from the premium measures. The average one week premium offered for a target is 
43.7% in the full sample. It is clear from all samples that a run-up in the target share price occurs 
before the announcement. The difference between 4 week and 1 day premiums on average is over 
10 percentage points in almost every sample.  
Premiums are higher in situations with multiple bidders, over 10 percentage points higher than in 
the full sample, but not clearly higher in situations where target management opposes the bid. 
The finding about competition increasing premium supports the finding of Bradley et al. (1988) 
who find higher wealth effects for target shareholders in multiple bidder situations. Higher than 
sample average, premiums are also paid in cross-border deals. US targets are paid and US bidders 
pay higher premiums than targets and bidders from the UK or other countries.  
The average deal size measured by target market capitalization is $US934.97 million. However, 
deal size significantly is higher in the subsamples consisting of other countries than the US and 
the UK. This could be because of more active acquisition market in the US and UK, so tender 
offers are used in smaller acquisitions as well. It could also be that in the US and UK even 
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smaller firms are publicly listed and that affects the average size in this sample which consists of 
only publicly listed targets. It is also notable that targets, measured by market value 4 weeks 
before the announcement, are larger in hostile and competed bids than the sample average.  
Generally the use of cash seems to be the dominating method of payment. On average 82.1% of 
the payment structure consists of cash. This could be somewhat again due to the data elimination 
process, as many events were eliminated because of unknown method of payment. The 
proportion of cash used is higher with US targets and acquirers and in cross-border deals where 
cash equals over 88% of the total consideration on average. Rossi and Volpin (2004) justify the 
higher than average use of cash in cross-border deals with the differences in corporate 
governance. The use of shares as a medium of exchange requires a high level of investor 
protection.  
The average toehold size equals 5.25%. It is somewhat higher, 6.51% in hostile bids. In the 
subsamples toeholds are lowest with US targets and acquirers and highest with targets and 
acquirers coming from other countries than the US and the UK.   
Panel B of Table 5 again shows the statistics for the smaller main sample. The average premiums 
seem to be consistently higher than in the full sample. The average size of the offers in which the 
offer price exceeds the 52-week high is almost double compared to offers where the offer price 
does not exceed the 52-week high. That could be a sign that bidders in large acquisitions tend to 
overpay for the targets (Moeller et al., 2004).  
Averages and standard deviations for shareholder and creditor protection for each sample are also 
reported. Generally it looks that the investor protection is slightly better on average in the target 
than in the acquirer country. Interestingly, higher variation in the average and standard deviation 
of creditor protection is observed in all samples. And the general level of creditor protection 
seems lower than the level of shareholder protection. One reason could be that over one-third of 
the observations come from the US which scores well on the shareholder protection index (6 out 
of 6) but poorly on the creditor protection measure (1 out of 4). But similar results are observed 
in the subsamples consisting of targets and acquirers outside the US and the UK.  
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Table 5: Summary statistics of non-categorical variables 
The table presents summary statistics, means and standard deviations for non-categorical variables for the full sample and subsamples in Panel A and for the 
sample including the comparison of the offer price to the 52-week high price of the target prior the announcement. Premiums, amount of cash and toehold are 
presented in percentage terms. Target size is the market value of the target in millions of US dollars, measured 4 weeks prior to the announcement of the offer. 
Shareholder and creditor protection indices are both scaled with the “Rule of Law” index. Shareholder protection index takes values between 0 and 6 while the 
creditor protection index ranges between 0 and 4.  
Panel A: Full Sample
Sample Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Full 38.2 % 0.56 43.7 % 0.60 48.7 % 0.64 82.1 % 0.34 5.25 % 0.12 934.97 3582.7 4.55 0.57 4.47 0.64 1.71 1.57 1.65 1.57
Hostile 39.4 % 0.42 44.6 % 0.45 48.8 % 0.43 80.1 % 0.35 6.51 % 0.10 1 836.52 6549.6 4.59 0.56 4.52 0.65 1.68 1.09 1.59 1.09
Competition 48.5 % 0.47 54.9 % 0.59 62.1 % 0.85 83.6 % 0.30 3.97 % 0.09 1 568.90 5935.1 4.59 0.56 4.50 0.69 1.62 1.07 1.53 1.04
Cross-border 41.0 % 0.58 47.0 % 0.60 52.5 % 0.65 88.3 % 0.28 5.14 % 0.11 1 181.20 4550.2 4.51 0.60 4.32 0.74 1.84 1.12 1.66 1.10
Target nation
US 42.3 % 0.42 49.2 % 0.49 57.8 % 0.69 89.9 % 0.22 2.48 % 0.08 566.93 1154.6 4.87 0.11 4.67 0.50 0.81 1.82 1.14 1.98
UK 36.8 % 0.33 41.9 % 0.37 43.7 % 0.38 76.0 % 0.39 3.71 % 0.09 1 051.63 4686.6 4.17 0.05 4.28 0.47 3.33 0.04 2.47 1.19
Other 34.7 % 0.77 38.9 % 0.78 42.1 % 0.69 77.6 % 0.39 9.14 % 0.15 1 250.67 4368.5 4.43 0.81 4.39 0.79 1.65 0.86 1.68 0.95
Acquirer nation
US 42.3 % 0.39 48.6 % 0.48 56.0 % 0.67 88.6 % 0.24 2.67 % 0.08 583.56 1287.8 4.75 0.35 4.87 0.12 1.18 2.05 0.81 1.88
UK 35.3 % 0.44 41.3 % 0.45 43.6 % 0.47 73.2 % 0.40 3.50 % 0.09 977.04 4690.7 4.31 0.39 4.17 0.05 2.72 1.05 3.33 0.04
Other 36.0 % 0.72 40.6 % 0.73 44.8 % 0.67 80.6 % 0.36 8.28 % 0.14 1 217.21 4246.6 4.48 0.72 4.27 0.85 1.70 0.98 1.59 0.90
Panel B: Sample with 52 week high as reference point
Full 41.8 % 0.48 47.8 % 0.54 53.8 % 0.69 88.3 % 0.26 5.28 % 0.12 945.74 3861.8 4.69 0.53 4.56 0.62 1.20 1.80 1.37 1.86
Premium higher 44.9 % 0.47 50.8 % 0.55 58.5 % 0.74 89.7 % 0.24 4.72 % 0.11 1153.99 4650.3 4.72 0.49 4.58 0.59 1.15 2.20 1.36 2.27
Premium lower 37.1 % 0.51 43.2 % 0.52 46.6 % 0.61 86.0 % 0.29 6.14 % 0.13 626.54 2115.0 4.65 0.58 4.51 0.66 1.29 0.85 1.40 0.94
Creditor protection
Target Acquirer Target Acquirer% Cash
ToeholdPremium Target sizePayment Shareholder protection
1 day 1 week 4 weeks
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Country and country group level subsamples 
Table 6 presents the last descriptive statistics table which reveals the country level differences in 
the characteristics of tender offers. Panel A shows individual countries with over 100 events each 
and Panel B the groups of other countries divided by their legal system. It shows how the offer 
characteristics differ even between developed countries using the same legal system.  
Probability of failure, hostility and competition is highest in Canada and Australia. Japan and the 
group of other countries with the German legal system experience the least failed offers, hostility 
and competition among bidders. Also Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note, that hostile takeovers are 
rare in these countries. 
Termination fees are used mainly in the US, UK, Canada and Australia, all belonging to the 
family of English common law. The use of termination fees is non-existent Japan and Sweden 
and almost non-existent in the other countries with German or Scandinavian legal systems (1 and 
2 events with termination fee observed respectively). On the other hand the use of toeholds is 
more common especially in Japan where 70 % of tender offers include a toehold and the toehold 
is also quite significant in size, 11.6% on average. This could be explained by the cross-holdings 
distinctive to Japanese companies (La Porta et al., 1999a) High toeholds, 15.9 % on average are 
observed with targets from the group English. 
Highest premiums are again observed with targets from the US. This could be explained by the 
average target size which is also smallest in the US, so relative premiums tend to be higher. The 
average size seems to be higher for less active takeover markets with the exception of United 
Kingdom which has the second highest amount of observations but also a high average target 
size. 
The level of shareholder protection seems to be generally higher than the level of creditor 
protection. Scandinavian countries have the highest value of shareholder protection while the best 
protection for creditors is provided by the UK. 
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Panel A: Single countries
Observations Successful Failed Hostile Competed Termination Cash only Toehold Cross-border Cross-industry LBO Premium: 1 day 1 week 4 weeks % Cash Toehold Target size Shareholder Creditor
United States 1492 1299 193 234 295 848 1299 308 428 835 172 42.3 % 49.2 % 57.8 % 89.9 % 2.5 % 566.9 4.87 0.81
87 % 13 % 16 % 20 % 57 % 87 % 21 % 29 % 56 % 12 %
United Kingdom 875 753 122 120 138 97 354 203 366 512 139 36.8 % 41.9 % 43.7 % 76.0 % 3.7 % 1 051.6 4.17 3.33
86 % 14 % 14 % 16 % 11 % 40 % 23 % 42 % 59 % 16 %
Canada 184 148 36 41 52 66 118 44 76 68 4 43.1 % 47.2 % 50.5 % 71.8 % 3.0 % 959.2 4.21 0.84
80 % 20 % 22 % 28 % 36 % 64 % 24 % 41 % 37 % 2 %
Australia 275 207 68 79 79 36 161 113 103 139 10 36.3 % 41.8 % 43.5 % 65.9 % 7.7 % 558.6 5.07 2.54
75 % 25 % 29 % 29 % 13 % 59 % 41 % 37 % 51 % 4 %
Japan 166 157 9 6 6 0 166 116 26 127 49 42.0 % 42.8 % 42.2 % 99.7 % 11.6 % 548.0 4.58 1.54
95 % 5 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 100 % 70 % 16 % 77 % 30 %
Sweden 104 86 18 10 10 0 71 28 57 64 14 30.8 % 36.5 % 42.9 % 72.3 % 6.8 % 891.4 5.16 0.87
83 % 17 % 10 % 10 % 0 % 68 % 27 % 55 % 62 % 13 %
Panel B: Country groups
English 208 168 40 15 25 6 160 119 88 134 14 29.3 % 33.2 % 37.9 % 83.4 % 15.9 % 634.8 4.14 2.13
81 % 19 % 7 % 12 % 3 % 77 % 57 % 42 % 64 % 7 %
French 284 244 40 37 61 10 191 117 131 151 28 31.7 % 36.7 % 40.4 % 74.2 % 9.5 % 3 320.9 3.66 1.17
86 % 14 % 13 % 21 % 4 % 67 % 41 % 46 % 53 % 10 %
German 85 79 6 5 10 1 66 33 59 46 10 24.3 % 30.8 % 36.5 % 85.6 % 8.6 % 1 373.9 3.93 1.84
93 % 7 % 6 % 12 % 1 % 78 % 39 % 69 % 54 % 12 %
Scandinavian 110 91 19 11 24 2 85 35 72 61 13 35.2 % 37.0 % 40.7 % 80.3 % 8.2 % 593.0 5.25 1.88
83 % 17 % 10 % 22 % 2 % 77 % 32 % 65 % 55 % 12 %
Success rate Characteristics Mean
Table 6: Statistics for target countries and country groups 
This table presents statistics of categorical variables and means for non-categorical variables for certain individual countries and groups constructed of the 
remaining countries. Countries with over 100 events, measured by being a target in an offer, are presented individually in Panel A and the rest of the countries 
are grouped together according to their legal system in Panel B. The four groups consist of the following countries; English: Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, 
India, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Africa and Thailand; French: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Venezuela; German: Austria, Germany, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan; Scandinavian: Denmark, Finland and Norway. 
Target size is the market value of the target in millions of US dollars, measured 4 weeks prior to the announcement of the offer.  Columns Shareholder and 
Creditor show the sample average value of shareholder and creditor protection. Shareholder and creditor protection indices are both scaled with the “Rule of 
Law” index. Shareholder protection index takes values between 0 and 6 while the creditor protection index ranges between 0 and 4.   
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5 RESULTS 
This section presents the empirical results of this thesis. First, I discuss the selection of variables 
and present the correlation between all independent variables. Then I move forward to the results 
of the different regressions. 
First, regressions with the full sample are presented. In the second of the regression analysis I 
analyze the effect of the offer premium to the offer outcome with the reference point variable 
linking the offer price to the 52-week high price of the target. In addition the results of several 
subsamples are shown in the next subsection. The last part of the regression analysis in this 
section discusses the effect of country-level investor protection to the outcome of cross-border 
tender offers. The final part presents the magnitude and effect of individual independent variables 
to the probability success.   
5.1 Selection of Variables 
This part discusses the selection of independent variables based on the correlation between 
independent variables. Correlations between all variables are presented in Table 7. 
I have multiple choices for premiums and for the method of payment of which I choose one 
variable for each. The correlations between one day, one and four week’s premium are very high. 
The one week premium has a correlation coefficient over 0.8 with both one day and four week 
premium. It is also less correlated with target size than the four week premium. So, one week 
premium is selected as the variable used for offer premium.  
The method of payment and percentage of cash variables are correlated and the value of the 
correlation coefficient is 0.658. However, the method of payment is also correlated with different 
investor protection variables. As the percentage of cash provides a more sophisticated measure of 
the payment structure used than the binary variable, it is selected as the variable to represent the 
method of payment used. 
The different measures for investor protection are almost all correlated, but the individual 
measures and the measures of difference are not used in the same regression equations.  
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Variables
Target 
attitude
Premium 
1 day
Premium 
1 week
Premium 
4 weeks
Premium          
> 52w high
Toehold Competition
Payment 
method
Percentage 
of cash
Target 
size
Termination
Difference: 
Shareholder
Difference: 
Creditor
Difference: 
Corruption
Target: 
Shareholder
Target: 
Creditor
Target: 
Corruption
Acquirer: 
Shareholder
Acquirer: 
Creditor
Acquirer: 
Corruption
Financial 
buyer
Cross-
border
Cross-
industry
Target attitude 	1.000
Premium 1 day 0.040 	1.000
Premium 1 week 0.031 0.898 	1.000
Premium 4 weeks 0.028 0.758 0.845 	1.000
Premium > 52w high -0.004 0.147 0.126 0.171 	1.000
Toehold 0.189 -0.069 -0.079 -0.089 -0.025 	1.000
Competition 0.216 0.156 0.151 0.155 0.100 0.012 	1.000
Payment method -0.026 0.049 0.063 0.081 0.043 0.069 -0.018 	1.000
Percentage of cash -0.024 0.087 0.089 0.083 0.031 0.105 -0.006 0.658 	1.000
Target size 0.123 -0.174 -0.210 -0.242 0.096 0.112 0.086 -0.111 -0.090 	1.000
Termination -0.211 0.046 0.072 0.103 0.025 -0.273 -0.069 0.193 0.056 -0.017 	1.000
Difference: Shareholder 0.010 -0.011 -0.014 -0.027 -0.014 0.010 0.016 -0.088 -0.012 -0.017 -0.097 	1.000
Difference: Creditor -0.012 -0.029 -0.012 -0.003 0.029 -0.003 -0.018 0.113 0.005 0.015 0.181 -0.283 	1.000
Difference: Corruption -0.021 0.017 0.031 0.049 0.041 -0.021 -0.071 0.076 0.016 0.028 0.175 -0.436 0.446 	1.000
Target: Shareholder 0.040 0.034 0.036 0.071 0.033 -0.028 0.041 0.209 0.027 -0.071 0.192 -0.373 0.192 0.158 	1.000
Target: Creditor -0.013 -0.081 -0.089 -0.126 -0.101 0.063 -0.039 -0.318 -0.082 -0.028 -0.387 0.153 -0.419 -0.258 -0.252 	1.000
Target: Corruption -0.025 -0.134 -0.147 -0.178 -0.147 0.098 -0.009 -0.195 -0.089 0.050 -0.326 0.150 -0.233 -0.404 -0.276 0.583 	1.000
Acquirer: Shareholder 0.048 0.045 0.044 0.058 0.028 -0.025 0.044 0.123 0.029 -0.086 0.106 0.460 -0.117 -0.237 0.563 -0.106 -0.148 	1.000
Acquirer: Creditor -0.023 -0.110 -0.101 -0.127 -0.054 0.054 -0.057 -0.210 -0.085 -0.028 -0.213 -0.122 0.420 0.166 -0.089 0.570 0.360 -0.209 	1.000
Acquirer: Corruption -0.045 -0.125 -0.130 -0.140 -0.089 0.087 -0.070 -0.145 -0.074 0.069 -0.185 -0.257 0.169 0.388 -0.128 0.349 0.613 -0.367 0.513 	1.000
Financial buyer -0.089 -0.023 -0.035 -0.047 0.033 -0.054 -0.002 0.038 0.125 -0.016 -0.041 0.060 -0.006 -0.063 -0.052 0.037 -0.013 -0.006 0.025 -0.060 	1.000
Cross-border -0.055 0.048 0.061 0.067 0.025 -0.024 -0.007 0.129 0.143 0.070 -0.022 -0.155 -0.063 0.078 -0.017 0.108 0.121 -0.156 0.040 0.179 -0.137 	1.000 	
Cross-industry -0.039 -0.038 -0.040 -0.043 -0.015 0.082 -0.018 0.102 0.153 -0.054 -0.058 0.040 0.014 -0.028 0.000 0.029 -0.026 0.030 0.048 -0.055 0.263 -0.086 	1.000
Table 7: Correlation between independent variables 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation between all independent variables. Variables having an absolute correlation higher than 0.2 have been highlighted 
with grey color. One day, one and four week premiums are highly correlated, but only one is used in the regressions. Also, the method of payment and 
percentage of cash are highly correlated. Only one of these measures is used in the regressions. Target attitude and competition are positively correlated. 
Termination fees are negatively correlated with target attitude, toehold and the level of target creditor protection and corruption. The measures for investor 
protection and differences among them are also highly correlated, but are not used simultaneously in regression. Out of the investor protection variables it seems 
that creditor rights and level of corruption are positively correlated and shareholder and creditor rights have negative correlation.        
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It seems that creditor rights and level of corruption are positively correlated and shareholder and 
creditor rights have negative correlation. As there is significant amount of correlation observed 
between these variables it may cause multicollinearity in the regressions. I have to look out for 
inconsistencies in the standard errors of the coefficients while conducting the regressions.         
5.2 Main Samples 
Table 8 shows the logit regression results for the full sample. The results are very clear and 
consistent throughout the development of the model as the number of variables is increased.  
Target attitude and competition are highly significant as expected, consistently at 1% level in 
each equation. The sign for both is negative, so the effect is clear, both hostile attitude of the 
target management and competing bidders decrease the probability of a single offer being 
successful. This is nothing special as almost all previous studies about tender offer success have 
shown that target attitude is probably the single most important contributor to the probability of 
success. Competition is less studied predictor of success, but Flanagan et al. (1998) found it to 
decrease the probability of success as well.  
In addition, I find the offer premium being a significant determinant of the offer success. It is 
significant at 1% level in all models except number four in which the level of significance drops 
to 5%. But again the results are consistent enough to say that the level premium increases the 
probability of tender offer success. The role of the premium has been the determinant which has 
seen the most contradictory results in different studies. This result is in line with Quirin, (1971), 
Walkling (1985) and Holl and Kyriazis (1996) but contradicts the results of Pelligrino (1972), 
Ebeid (1974), Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) and Flanagan et al., (1998). It is understandable that 
the older studies did not find premium as a significant determinant as they might have had some 
errors with the specification as deal rumors might have affected the size of the premium 
(Walkling, 1985). Flanagan et al. (1998) used only a US dataset retrieved from SDC as I have 
done. One reason for the insignificance could be that premiums paid for US targets are generally 
already on a high level. I will return to this result in the country level subsamples.      
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Variables Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Target attitude - -2.528*** -2.534*** -2.363*** -2.360*** -2.484***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition - -1.743*** -1.835*** -1.846*** -1.845*** -1.928***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Premium 1 week + 0.442*** 0.422*** 0.385** 0.429***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
% of cash + 0.464*** 0.386** 0.378** 0.344**
(0.003) (0.014) (0.022) (0.043)
Toehold + 0.039 0.097 0.252
(0.938) (0.848) (0.625)
Termination + 1.086*** 1.087*** 1.115***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Target size - 0.031 0.018 0.032
(0.427) (0.642) (0.434)
Constant 2.959 2.429 2.087 2.222 1.965
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables
Cross-border 0.198 0.230*
(0.109) (0.068)
Cross-industry -0.199* -0.229*
(0.094) (0.057)
Financial buyer 0.001 -0.035
(0.995) (0.854)
Year dummies No No No No Yes
Statistics
Correct predictions 87.60 % 87.84 % 87.79 % 87.68 % 88.21 %
Nagelkerke R
2
0.361 0.368 0.385 0.388 0.399
Pseudo R
2
0.274 0.280 0.295 0.297 0.307
Observations 3783 3783 3783 3783 3783
Models
Table 8: Logit regression results for the full sample 
This table presents the results of the logit regression for the full sample. Tender offer success is the dependent 
variable. Target attitude, competition, termination, cross-border, cross-industry and financial buyer are all dummy 
variables. Premium, percentage of consideration paid in cash and toehold are continuous variables denoted in 
percentage terms. Target size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the target in $US million four 
weeks prior to the offer. Year dummies represent each year present in the sample. p-values for the coefficients are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% level with the two-tailed test.    
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Also the percentage of cash used as consideration and the inclusion of termination fees are 
significant determinants of success. The signs are positive as expected, increasing the percentage 
of cash used and including a termination fee binding the target increase the probability of 
success. Termination fee is consistently significant at 1% level while the significance of 
percentage of cash drops from 1% level to 5% with the addition of variables. The results are as 
expected as cash is the most concrete and easiest to understand method of payment. There are no 
valuation effects, such as bidder overvaluation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) which the target 
shareholder should take into consideration. Termination fees make it costly for targets to 
withdraw so their inclusion should also act in the favor of the bidder. Flanagan et al. (1998) also 
found the inclusion of termination fees to increase the probability of success.  
Toehold and target size are found to be insignificant determinants of tender offer success. The 
sign for toehold is positive as expected but interestingly, and unexpectedly positive for target size 
as well. However, the significance level for both variables is very low. The insignificance of 
toehold contradicts Walkling (1985), Holl and Kyriazis (1996), Flanagan et al. (1998) and 
Elsland & Weber (2006), but the reason could be that toeholds are observed and associated 
mainly with hostile bids (Betton et al., 2009). I return to this puzzle in the next subsection where 
I present the results for the subsamples containing only hostile bids. 
The cross-border and cross-industry control variables both somewhat contribute to the success of 
a tender offer. Both are significant at 10% significance level. The sign for cross-border deals is 
positive which indicates that those should succeed more often, and negative for cross-industry 
deals. Flanagan et al. (1998) find the same effects for these variables. They offer an explanation 
for cross-border deals being more successful in the simple fact that local management is less 
likely to be fired after the acquisition because of their knowledge of the local business 
environment. The reason for cross-industry deals being less successful could be that bidders from 
other industries are do not have the necessary expertize in the target industry, do not understand 
the value-creation in that industry and end up bidding too low.            
The fit of the model is average as the value of Nagelkerke R
2 
for the final model is 0.399. 
However, the fit improves with the addition of main and control variables. The amount of correct 
predictions is 88.21% in the final model. The amount of correct predictions stays in the same 
level throughout the development of the model. Table 9 presents statistics about the predictive 
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% Correct
1 0
1 3152 366 89.60 %
0 80 185 69.81 %
Total 3232 551 88.20 %
Observed
Outcome
ability of the model. The predictive ability for positive outcomes is good at 89.60% but 
remarkably lower for negative outcomes. The model can predict only 69.81% of the negative 
outcomes correctly, but that is probably evident as only 15% of the offers in the sample failed.  
Table 9: Prediction accuracy of the logistic regression model 
This table shows the prediction accuracy of the logistic model for positive and negative outcomes and the amount 
and percentage of observations which are correctly and incorrectly classified.  
 
 
 
 
 
Sample with the 52-week high measure 
The second set of regressions adds the behavioral premium variable, the use of 52-week high as a 
reference point for the offer price, used by Baker et al. (2009) to shed more light into the 
dilemma experienced with the role of the premium offered for the target shareholders as a 
determinant for the offer’s success. As already mentioned previous studies have revealed 
ambiguous results about the significance of the premium. Baker et al. (2009), reason that the 
reference point theory complements other theories of mergers; especially in the case of analyzing 
the offer premia. They focus especially on the 52-week high as a judgmental reference point for 
investors as it is widely reported in financial press and thus provides an easy psychological 
benchmark for valuing a company.  
Results of the second regression analysis are shown in Table 10. The effect and significance of 
other variables remain steady and enhance the results of the first regression with the large sample 
presented in Table 8.  
Only changes are the sign for target size variable is now negative, cross-border variable loses its 
significance and the significance of the percentage of cash used and cross-industry variables 
increases. These changes can be due to the smaller sample size and elimination of certain events 
that did not have share price data. 
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Variables Expected (1) (2) (3) (4)
Target attitude - -2.399*** -2.416*** -2.425*** -2.638***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition - -1.247*** -1.282*** -1.264*** -1.531***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Premium 1 week + 0.298 0.252 0.284
(0.125) (0.191) (0.130)
% of cash + 0.807*** 0.792*** 0.845*** 0.802***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Toehold + -0.058 0.034 0.155 0.545
(0.928) (0.958) (0.813) (0.422)
Termination + 1.485*** 1.476*** 1.473*** 1.730***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Target size - -0.078 -0.056 -0.077 -0.285
(0.142) (0.303) (0.168) (0.629)
Constant 1.683 1.475 1.685 1.640
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Premium > 52w high + 0.469*** 0.426*** 0.434*** 0.310*
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.073)
Control variables
Cross-border 0.211 0.242
(0.225) (0.186)
Cross-industry -0.312* -0.402**
(0.064) (0.022)
Financial buyer -0.073 -0.298
(0.761) (0.232)
Year dummies No No No Yes
Statistics
Correct predictions 87.70 % 88.08 % 87.38 % 87.97 %
Nagelkerke R
2
0.421 0.422 0.427 0.460
Pseudo R
2
0.318 0.320 0.324 0.353
Observations 1854 1854 1854 1845
Models
Table 10: Logit regression results with the 52-week high measure 
This table presents the results of the logit regression for the sample which includes the 52-week high measure. 
Premium > 52w high is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of 1 if the offer price exceeds the 52-week high 
price and the value of 0 otherwise. All other variables remain the same. Premium 1 week is replaced with Premium > 
52w high in model one. Premium 1 week is added in model two. Models 3 and 4 add control variables and year 
dummies. p-values for the coefficients are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% level 
with the two-tailed test. 9 observations are omitted from model 4 due to year dummy for 1992 predicting the 
outcome perfectly.     
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The first model replaces the variable Premium 1 week with the variable Premium > 52w high, 
which is the dummy variable whether the offer price exceeds the 52-week high price of the target 
measured for the 52 past weeks 30 days prior the offer. The rest of the models add back the 
conventional premium measure, control variables and year dummies. 
The behavioral premium variable is highly significant at 1% level when used alone and with the 
one week premium variable. The significance decreases to 10% level with the addition of year 
dummies. The reason could be that the annual division of the sample is skewed towards the 
2000s which could cause the year dummies to have such an effect. As the significance of the 
behavioral premium is very high, the significance of the conventional premium measure 
(observed to be significant at 1% level in Table 9) fades away and becomes insignificant. 
These results help to understand the ambiguous results gained for the significance of the tender 
offer premium. The significance of the behavioral premium and the insignificance of the 
conventional premium measure suggest that the absolute level of the premium is not everything 
but investor psychology plays also a role when evaluating the offer. Target shareholders clearly 
use psychological anchors or reference points in evaluating the premiums offered.  Exceeding the 
reference point price, in this case the 52-week high price of the target increases the probability of 
the offer being successful. The same result is obtained by Baker et al. (2009) in their paper. 
The amount of correct predictions, 87.97% is in line with the number of correct predictions in the 
full sample. However, the fit of the model is better, the Nagelkerke R
2
 being 0.460. The fit of the 
model is better as the sample is smaller and the behavioral premium variable could also add into 
the predictive power of the model.       
Country level regressions 
The analysis for country and country group subsamples is conducted to supplement the main 
regression analyses. Table 11 presents the results. It shows some country level differences 
between different countries and areas and acts as an example that similar tender offer tactics are 
not effective in every country. But as most of the countries have been grouped together according 
to their legal system no final conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. The grouping is done 
as a very high amount of the observations are from the US and the UK, and only 6 countries had 
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over 100 observations each in the full sample, measured by the amount of tender offer targets. 
Out of these six, Japan and Sweden had to be merged to the country groups according to their 
legal system, as the regressions for those countries suffered from too many perfectly predicting 
variables which affected the results of the model.    
But the subsamples provide some interesting details to the main analysis. Again in every sample, 
target attitude and competition variables are highly significant at 1% level. This is observed even 
in subsamples English and German where the amount of hostile offers is very low and 
competition among bidders rare.  
Premium is significant only in UK and in English civil law countries, at 5% level in both. Same 
result is drawn by Holl and Kyriazis (1996) for the UK. These are countries for which the 
average one week premium is lower than the average for the full sample. For example the US and 
Canada experience insignificant premiums but both countries have higher than average premiums 
overall. But as other subsamples also have lower than average premiums and not significant 
results no conclusions can be drawn. This only shows that different samples will give differing 
results. 
However, toehold positive and is significant at 10% level for US and UK but significant at the 
same level and negative for the sample English. It is also negative but insignificant for samples 
German and Scandinavian. Significant positive effect confirms the results of Walkling (1985) in 
the US and Holl and Kyriazis (1996) in the UK. Negative sign in the other subsamples could be 
explained by the relation of toehold and hostility (Betton et al., 2009).       
The country level analysis confirms that the significance and use of termination fees concentrates 
to the US. In samples English and French the sign is even negative. Termination fees, which are 
fines for withdrawing from the offer could be interpreted as a sign of distrust in certain cultures 
and thus have a negative effect on the outcome of the offer. Termination fees are very rare in the 
samples German and Scandinavian and the variable was omitted from the model.  
Percentage of cash is negative and significant at 5% level in sample English while target size has 
a negative and significant effect at 10% in sample French.  
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Table 11: Logit regression results for country and country group subsamples 
The regression results for different countries and country groups are presented here. The subsamples are taken from the full sample, so the 
behavioral premium variable is not used. p-values for the coefficients are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
level with the two-tailed test. Variable Financial buyer is omitted from the sample for Australia and variable Termination from German and 
Scandinavian country group samples as those variables predicted the outcome perfectly. Other reason for omitting events from the 
subsamples was the perfect predicting ability of certain year dummies. 
1
 Too many variables predicted success perfectly and had to be 
omitted from subsamples for Japan and Sweden, so those country samples were merged with the German and Scandinavian samples, 
respectively. 
2
 Percentage of cash is substituted for the dummy variable Cash in this subsample due to perfect predicting power.  
 
 
Variables US UK Canada Australia Japan
1
Sweden
1
English French German Scandinavian
Target attitude -2.836*** -2.902*** -2.182*** -2.295*** -3.745*** -1.855*** -7.341*** -3.187***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition -1.591*** -2.780*** -2.138*** -1.720*** -2.913*** -2.166*** -3.020** -2.814***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000)
Premium 1 week 0.255 0.854** 0.748 -0.013 1.802** 0.598 -1.355 1.423
(0.339) (0.038) (0.299) (0.965) (0.035) (0.274) (0.226) (0.238)
% of cash 0.136 0.410 -0.462 1.450*** -1.210 -1.972** -1.600
2
0.552
(0.789) (0.259) (0.552) (0.005) (0.185) (0.039) (0.603) (0.425)
Toehold 2.685* 2.856* 6.142 2.510 -3.254* 2.710 -2.584 -0.513
(0.091) (0.056) (0.170) (0.160) (0.052) (0.160) (0.496) (0.726)
Termination 1.652*** 0.332 1.145 0.309 -1.181 -0.586
(0.000) (0.618) (0.106) (0.651) (0.380) (0.652)
Target size 0.050 0.141 0.139 -0.181 0.039 -0.285* -0.277 0.048
(0.532) (0.130) (0.478) (0.249) (0.866) (0.085) (0.592) (0.830)
Constant 1.455 0.954 -0.308 3.357 4.357 5.913 10.554 2.473
(0.131) (0.491) (0.868) (0.025) (0.034) (0.004) (0.035) (0.151)
Control variables
Cross-border 0.699** -0.106 0.605 -0.601 0.782 0.506 -0.551 -0.178
(0.011) (0.719) (0.323) (0.162) (0.153) (0.308) (0.615) (0.743)
Cross-industry -0.320 -0.146 0.722 -0.609 -1.44** 0.091 -2.123 -0.242
(0.164) (0.579) (0.215) (0.121) (0.026) (0.856) (0.171) (0.660)
Financial buyer -0.396 0.203 -2.327** 0.291 2.025 -1.897* 0.614
(0.218) (0.579) (0.013) (0.762) (0.114) (0.081) (0.514)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statistics
Correct predictions 91.64 % 88.80 % 85.71 % 80.88 % 82.22 % 86.94 % 96.98 % 87.10 %
Nagelkerke R
2
0.507 0.430 0.474 0.403 0.362 0.483 0.66 0.463
Pseudo R
2
0.412 0.337 0.353 0.284 0.259 0.381 0.597 0.348
Observations 1471 875 161 272 180 268 199 186
Models
Individual countries Country groups
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The last point from this country level analysis is the significance of the variable financial buyer 
representing the deal type being an LBO in samples Australia and German. In both of these 
samples the effect of the deal being an LBO is negative. The level of significance is 5% in 
Australia and 10% in the German sample. This results hints that culture has an effect to the 
attitude towards LBOs as well.    
5.3 Hostile and Competed Offers 
As target attitude and the number of bidders has been proven to be the most significant factors 
affecting the outcome of the offer in the previous regressions I wanted to examine these 
subsamples more carefully, as more information about the role of the premium and toehold could 
be revealed. Table 12 presents the results for subsamples in which the bid is hostile (1), non-
hostile (2), there are multiple bidders (3) or there is only a single bidder (4). 
I begin to discuss the results from models 1 and 2, hostile and non-hostile samples. First, my 
interest turns to the variable toehold, which is highly significant at 1% level in both hostile 
samples. The sign is positive, so buying a toehold in the target prior to the tender offer increases 
the probability of success. Acquiring a toehold could scare the competition away although the 
offer is hostile. This explains my previous results and confirms the observation by Betton et al. 
(2009) that toeholds are mainly observed in hostile bids. Toeholds lead into pre-announcement 
run-up in the target share price (Schwert, 1996; Bris, 2002), but as hostile offers are associated 
usually with competition the level of premiums is already high and the run-up does not matter.  
The opposite is observed in non-hostile bids in which the sign for toehold is negative and 
significant at 10% in the full sample. The run-up could cause the premium offered to shrink and 
have a negative effect on the outcome of the offer. The variable is not significant in models 3 and 
4 which deal with multiple and single bidder situations. According to Bulow et al. (1999) 
toeholds should have a significant effect in takeover battles, but I find evidence of that. The 
differing result is partly explained by the difference in samples. Bulow et al. (1999) focus only in 
takeover contests between financial buyers.      
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Target attitude -1.783*** -2.914*** -2.234*** -2.973***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition -1.268*** -2.410*** -1.276*** -2.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Premium 1 week 0.520** 0.336* 0.555** 0.353 0.273 0.316 0.375 0.347
(0.043) (0.098) (0.013) (0.102) (0.387) (0.213) (0.322) (0.143)
% of cash 0.167 0.454** 0.576* 0.249 0.891 0.973*** 1.49*** 0.665**
(0.578) (0.037) (0.066) (0.247) (0.137) (0.004) (0.017) (0.043)
Toehold 2.891*** -1.012* 1.13 -0.188 4.781*** -0.479 2.486 0.237
(0.004) (0.091) (0.280) (0.758) (0.004) (0.535) (0.148) (0.762)
Termination 2.242*** 0.836*** 1.058*** 1.106*** 4.231*** 1.345*** 1.273*** 1.986***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Target size 0.087 0.163 0.072 0.010 0.061 -0.037 0.088 -0.059
(0.182) (0.765) (0.238) (0.857) (0.547) (0.639) (0.387) (0.441)
Constant -2.198 3.043 -0.156 2.188 -2.800 2.498 -1.035 1.959
(0.012) (0.000) (0.841) (0.000) (0.016) (0.001) (0.330) (0.005)
Premium > 52w high 0.059 0.304 0.058 0.425**
(0.859) (0.159) (0.867) (0.043)
Control variables
Cross-border 0.201 0.228 0.036 0.346** -0.026 0.444* 0.046 0.321
(0.357) (0.153) (0.852) (0.041) (0.940) (0.066) (0.890) (0.163)
Cross-industry -0.214 -0.307* -0.095 -0.363** -0.133 -0.653*** -0.342 -0.570**
(0.292) (0.052) (0.619) (0.023) (0.678) (0.006) (0.287) (0.011)
Financial buyer -0.383 -0.028 -0.171 0.102 -0.686 -0.296 -0.255 -0.184
(0.393) (0.899) (0.619) (0.688) (0.217) (0.330) (0.565) (0.564)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statistics
Correct predictions 69.09 % 92.48 % 72.05 % 92.15 % 71.43 % 91.69 % 79.47 % 91.17 %
Nagelkerke R
2
0.227 0.225 0.281 0.329 0.300 0.258 0.394 0.449
Pseudo R
2
0.135 0.183 0.173 0.268 0.187 0.209 0.258 0.362
Observations 550 3206 694 3083 280 1553 341 1495
Models
Full Sample Sample with 52w high
 
Table 12: Logit regression results for hostile and competed offers 
The results for the logit regression according to the target attitude and number of bidders are presented here. Both 
samples, full and the smaller one with the behavioral premium variable, are analyzed. Models 1 and 2 present results 
for regressions for hostile and non-hostile offers, while models 3 and 4 do the same for multiple and single bidder 
situations. In order to avoid collinearity variable Target attitude is omitted from models 1 and 2, and variable 
Competition is omitted from models 3 and 4 for the same reason. p-values for the coefficients are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% level with the two-tailed test.    
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Then to the analysis of the one week premium variable, which is significant at 5% level and 
positive in hostile and multiple bidder situations. So, a higher premium helps the success of a 
single offer in hostile bids and in bidding contests. The result supports the theory by Fishman 
(1988) that high bids help winning control contests and the results of Schwert (2000) that 
managers use hostility tactically to solicit higher premiums from bidders. The premium variable 
is positive and barely significant at 10% level in the non-hostile sample as well which makes 
sense as that sample includes both contested and non-contested offers. The premium is 
insignificant in the sample with a single bidder (4). These results improve the understanding 
about the role of the size of the offer premium. The premium is significant and affects the 
outcome positively especially in situations where management uses hostility as a negotiating 
tactic and in situations where there is a multiple bidder contest for control. In single bidder 
situations other factors have a higher impact on the outcome of the offer. 
The behavioral premium is significant at 5% level and has a positive effect on the outcome of the 
offer in single bidder situations. The explanation is logical. In multiple bidder situations the target 
shareholders can compare the competing bids and premiums but with a single offer they have to 
benchmark the offer with some other reference point. So, the effect of exceeding the 
psychological price level is positive especially when there is only one bid outstanding. 
The method of payment, percentage of cash is positive and significant especially in non-hostile 
and multiple bidder situations. This is consistent with (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; 
Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993) who both report that the proportion of cash used in the payment 
structure increases with additional bidders. So, a higher percentage of cash used increases the 
probability of tender offer success. The variable is also positive and significant at 5 % level with 
the smaller sample in single bidder situations.  
The significance of cross-border and industry status seems to escalate in non-hostile and single 
bidder offers. Especially cross-industry status has a significant negative impact on the outcome of 
the offer. Cross-border status has a positive but less powerful and significant effect on the 
outcome. The effect of the cross-border status is easier to understand as cross-border offers 
provide higher premiums on average which increases the probability of success. The strong 
negative effect of cross-industry deals is more difficult to comprehend. One already mentioned 
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reason could be the lack of target industry knowledge held by the bidder which leads to lower 
than expected offer premiums. Other explanation could be the value destruction observed with 
conglomerate mergers and highly diversified companies (Lamont and Polk, 2002).        
5.4 Cross-border Offers 
In this final part of presenting my empirical results I concentrate on cross-border offers and add 
variables representing the level of investor protection in each target and acquirer country. 
Acquisitions where positive corporate governance transfer occurs, when a company from a better 
governance environment acquires a company from a worse environment, has been observed to 
yield abnormal returns by Bris and Cabolis (2008a and 2008b) and by Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008). Now I test whether the differences in the level of investor protection affect the outcome 
of the tender offer. First, I use differences for shareholder and creditor protection and level of 
corruption to represent the corporate governance transfer that would occur if the tender offer 
succeeded.  
Table 13 presents the results for the first regressions with cross-border offers. Results without (1) 
and with (2) the investor protection variables are included. The results prove to be very similar. 
Target management attitude and competition have a negative effect on the outcome and are 
highly significant in all models. One week premium and percentage of cash used have no effect 
as the premium offered and amount of cash used are higher than average in cross-border offers. 
The frequency of use of termination fees is similar to the full sample but the significance of the 
effect of the termination fees is lesser in cross-border offers. 
The behavioral premium (Premium > 52w high) is positive and significant at 10% in both models 
which validates the conclusion that psychology definitely plays a part in evaluating the tender 
offer premium offered and that exceeding the chosen reference point, the target 52-week high in 
this case, improves the probability of success. 
The variables representing changes in investor protection are all not significant. The sign for 
difference in shareholder protection is negative as expected, which somewhat signals that tender 
offers resulting in positive corporate governance transfer have a smaller probability of 
succeeding.   
77 
 
Variables Expected (1) (2) (1) (2)
Target attitude - -2.718*** -2.272*** -3.913*** -4.053***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition - -2.129*** -2.144*** -1.927*** -1.991***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Premium 1 week + 0.286 0.280 0.313 0.334
(0.215) (0.230) (0.311) (0.287)
% of cash + 0.242 0.260 0.324 0.336
(0.531) (0.502) (0.632) (0.621)
Toehold + 0.365 0.354 1.384 1.359
(0.692) (0.702) (0.335) (0.350)
Termination + 0.669** 0.600* 1.231** 1.042**
(0.027) (0.054) (0.012) (0.037)
Target size - 0.104 0.108 0.064 0.086
(0.152) (0.138) (0.605) (0.493)
Constant 2.224 2.250 2.155 2.065
(0.006) (0.006) (0.074) (0.090)
Premium > 52w high + 0.649* 0.644*
(0.089) (0.094)
Investor protection
Difference: Shareholder - -0.005 -0.149
(0.962) (0.399)
Difference: Creditor - 0.107 0.166
(0.122) (0.230)
Difference: Corruption -0.041 0.127
(0.565) (0.332)
Control variables
Cross-industry -0.139 -0.033 -0.525 -0.499
(0.948) (0.879) (0.148) (0.183)
Financial buyer -0.251 -0.251 0.033 0.170
(0.538) (0.539) (0.965) (0.830)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statistics
Correct predictions 90.09 % 90.09 % 91.90 % 91.72 %
Nagelkerke R
2
0.402 0.404 0.549 0.561
Pseudo R
2
0.319 0.321 0.448 0.459
Observations 1403 1403 580 580
Full Sample Sample with 52w high
Models
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Logit regression results with investor protection differences 
This table presents the results for logistic regressions of cross-border tender offers with the 
investor protection difference variables. Model 1 analyses cross-border offers without the 
investor protection variables which are added in model 2. Difference between shareholder and  
creditor protection and level of corruption is calculated by deducting the target value from the 
acquirer value. Shareholder protection index ranges from 0 to 6, creditor protection from 0 to 4 
and level of corruption from 0 to 5 (0 indicating poor level and 4,5 and 6 high level). Variable 
Cross-border is omitted to avoid collinearity. p-values for the coefficients are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% level with the two-tailed test.     
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However, the results are far from significant so no conclusions can be drawn from here. I find no 
signs of resistance occurring due to the managers’ fear of losing their private benefits. The sign 
for the difference in creditor protection is positive, but again the coefficient is not significant. The 
positive sign could be explained by a matter discussed by Bris and Cabolis (2008a). They note 
that the transferability of creditor rights is not as good as with shareholder rights so the difference 
in creditor rights should not create additional resistance. 
The reliability of the results should be on a good level as the amount of correct predictions and R
2 
measures are higher than in the full sample. In addition I did not notice any significant changes in 
the standard errors with the addition of the investor protection variables. 
The fact that acquisitions improving target governance yield positive abnormal returns but have 
no effect on the probability of the offer succeeding can be explained. As the acquirer can create 
more value with targets coming from worse corporate governance environments, the acquirer 
coming from can also pay higher premiums for the target which should decrease the resistance. 
The target attitude variable has a very strong influence on the outcome and can absorb many 
kinds of effects. One very interesting aspect to study in conjunction with the corporate 
governance transfer and private benefits of the managers would be the stock ownership of the 
target management. It could provide additional information about the subject.      
As the difference approach proved to be unfruitful in explaining hostility, resistance or other 
effects to the outcome of the offer in cross-border deals I continue to examine the matter with 
individual variables for investor protection next. 
Regressions with individual investor protection variables    
The regressions results with individual investor protection variables for the target and acquirer 
are shown in Table 14. The variables are added progressively so the effects of high correlation 
between the variables can be monitored. However, I did not find any significant changes in the 
standard errors of the investor protection variables, so I can rule out collinearity. In the first 
model, only variables for the target are included (1) then acquirer variables are added (2). The 
last model (3) also adds the level of corruption variable for both target and acquirer. 
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Target attitude -2.751*** -2.763*** -2.258*** -4.060*** -4.088*** -4.050***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition -2.138*** -2.150*** -2.159*** -2.056*** -2.157*** -2.109***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Premium 1 week 0.278 0.284 0.285 0.326 0.346 0.386
(0.220) (0.208) (0.204) (0.317) (0.285) (0.243)
% of cash 0.229 0.225 0.227 0.139 0.225 0.192
(0.556) (0.562) (0.559) (0.836) (0.743) (0.778)
Toehold 0.555 0.593 0.599 2.091 1.894 2.005
(0.558) (0.534) (0.529) (0.171) (0.211) (0.189)
Termination 0.541* 0.549* 0.525* 1.080** 1.124** 1.018**
(0.084) (0.080) (0.098) (0.030) (0.025) (0.046)
Target size 0.010 0.098 0.094 0.077 0.063 0.064
(0.176) (0.187) (0.207) (0.546) (0.622) (0.621)
Constant 3.482 3.660 4.355 3.641 4.616 5.542
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.062) (0.031) (0.022)
Premium > 52w high 0.705* 0.696* 0.652*
(0.070) (0.074) (0.098)
Investor protection
Target: Shareholder -0.161 -0.148 -0.136 -0.059 -0.034 -0.072
(0.375) (0.418) (0.459) (0.836) (0.906) (0.804)
Target: Creditor -0.250** -0.252** -0.239** -0.560*** -0.527** -0.407*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.006) (0.010) (0.091)
Acquirer: Shareholder -0.037 -0.088 -0.275 -0.285
(0.777) (0.524) (0.239) (0.231)
Acquirer: Creditor -0.047 0.000 0.032 0.080
(0.624) (0.996) (0.842) (0.644)
Target: Corruption -0.058 -0.251
(0.635) (0.283)
Acquirer: Corruption -0.136 -0.080
(0.202) (0.676)
Control variables
Cross-industry 0.003 0.011 -0.026 -0.581 -0.559 -0.553
(0.988) (0.958) (0.903) (0.115) (0.132) (0.145)-0.221
Financial buyer -0.220 -0.211 -0.194 -0.023 0.125 0.221
(0.590) (0.608) (0.640) (0.977) (0.877) (0.788)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statistics
Correct predictions 89.95 % 89.95 % 90.16 % 91.90 % 92.07 % 92.41 %
Nagelkerke R
2
0.409 0.409 0.411 0.566 0.569 0.572
Pseudo R
2
0.325 0.326 0.327 0.464 0.465 0.470
Observations 1403 1403 1403 580 580 580
Sample with 52w highFull Sample
Models
  Table 14: Logit regression results with individual investor protection variables 
The results for logit regressions with individual investor protection variables for both target and acquirer 
are presented here. Variable Cross-border is omitted to avoid collinearity. p-values for the coefficients are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% level with the two-tailed test.     
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The results for other variables than the ones measuring investor protection are exactly the same as 
for the first set of regressions of cross-border offers reported in table 13. I will not go further into 
those results as they have been discussed already. 
Variables for both target and acquirer shareholder protection are negative but insignificant. That 
is not surprising as target shareholders can have their say in tender offers by just accepting or 
rejecting the offer. The level of shareholder protection should not matter as long as the ownership 
of shareholders in the target company is acknowledged. Acquirer shareholders should not affect 
the outcome of the offer if an offer is already made. They should be able to have their say already 
when the acquiring company is making the decision whether to tender or not. This provides 
additional evidence of the explanatory power of the anti-director rights index. Previously 
Spamann (2010) has also proven many of the older findings based on the anti-director rights 
index by La Porta et al. (1998) false. The level of corruption variable is not significant either for 
the target or for the acquirer. 
What is surprising but not unexpected is the significance of the target creditor right variable. The 
coefficient is negative, so the improvement in target country creditor rights decreases the 
probability of the offer being successful. It is consistently significant at 5% level apart from a few 
exceptions. The deviations from this significance level are probably due to the absence of 
acquirer investor protection variables in model 1 and the addition of level of corruption variables 
in model 3. There is high correlation between these variables which can cause the differences. 
Creditors and banks are highly influential in some countries and creditor influence increases with 
the improvement of creditor rights. And not just as financiers but can also have significant 
influence over operational decisions as well. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note, debt holders 
have an incentive to monitor the company and its operations closely when they have large 
amounts of money at stake.  
However, I have to dig deeper into the literature to find a credible explanation for these results; 
that better target creditor rights have a negative impact on the outcome of the offer.    
Strong influence of banks in the decision making of industrial companies could be one reason. 
Germany and Japan act as prime examples. Franks and Mayer (1994) state that banks have a high 
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influence in company matters and can interrupt contests for corporate control in Germany where 
creditor rights are at a high level and takeover codes further make it harder for acquirers to gain 
control in companies. This happens even though the bank might not even be a majority 
shareholder. In many cases the bank has representation in the supervisory board of the company. 
Bank representation in the boards of industrial companies is observed in Japan as well (Sheard, 
1994). Bank equity ownership in industrial companies is common in both countries. However, 
the strong influence of creditors persists in other countries as well. Djankov et al. (2007) find in 
their study of 129 countries that high creditor protection implies a larger private credit sector. In 
countries with high creditor protection the role of private creditors as lenders is higher measured 
by the relative amount of private credit to GDP. Thus the influence of private creditors is higher 
in these countries. 
A more general theory which could explain especially the negative nature is the asset substitution 
problem. The asset substitution problem presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is a conflict 
between the share and bondholders of the firm. The conflict arises from shareholders trying to 
increase the riskiness of the company assets and the value of equity at the cost of the 
bondholders. A tender offer could be interpreted as a similar situation when a bidder notices a 
low risk company and makes a bid for it with a plan to increase value of the company by 
undertaking riskier projects. As the lenders of the company become worried about their returns 
they use their influence over the current company management to resist the takeover attempt. 
And in countries with high-quality creditor rights the private credit sector is larger and creditors 
hold significant influence over corporate matters. 
The asset substitution theory is supported by the results of Acharya et al. (2009) who find that 
companies in countries with strong creditor rights follow less risky operating strategies, have 
lower cash flow risk, lower leverage and make diversifying acquisitions that decrease risk. In the 
light of these results it makes sense that efficient creditor rights in target countries have a 
negative effect on the outcome of a tender offer as lenders of the target perceive the acquisition 
attempt as a risk-increasing action threatening the cash flows for the lenders.  
Furfine and Rosen (2009) find, contrary to previous beliefs, that mergers actually increase the 
default risk of the acquirer. Reasons for increasing risk include the increase in the level of debt by 
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the acquirer, the use of option-based compensation encouraging risk-taking for the management 
and asymmetric information and idiosyncratic stock volatility of the acquirer. When information 
is asymmetric it is easier to cover idiosyncratic volatility and the risk-increasing nature of the 
merger. Although these results are achieved with mergers, it is likely that similar effects are 
associated with tender offers as well, and that the increased riskiness of the acquirer is reflected 
in the acquired target as well.      
One additional reason for the result concerning target creditor rights is presented by Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) and relates to cultural differences between countries. They find culture 
affecting creditor rights more than shareholder rights. Religion explains the strength of creditor 
rights in a country, Lutheran countries having stronger rights than Catholic countries. I find 
greater cross-country variation in creditor rights than in shareholder rights, so creditor rights 
could reflect cultural aspects better and could be a possible explanation but would require further 
study.    
It would have been interesting to replicate the results of Acharya et al. (2009) relating to the 
riskiness of business operations with my own data, but unfortunately, the lack and the low quality 
of the of financial statement data available it made it very unreliable, which forced me to forfeit 
any extra analysis. In the preliminary regressions, the overall fit of the model measured by the R
2 
measure was so low (less than 0.05) that any results would be quite difficult to justify. 
I decide to stick with the asset substitution theory for explaining the result of better target creditor 
rights decreasing the probability of tender offer success. In countries with better creditor rights 
the lenders have higher influence over companies. And a tender offer for a company is potentially 
a risk-increasing event that has the possibility to disrupt the cash flows of the target. Because of 
this the lenders of the target use their influence over the target management and resist the tender 
offer and its asset substituting effects.    
5.5 Analysis of Success Probabilities           
In addition to the significance of the independent variables it is important to analyze the marginal 
effects of single independent variables to the probability of an offer being successful even though 
very few earlier papers have done this. Table 15 presents the results of the marginal effect 
analysis. The analysis is conducted by changing the value of a single independent variable while 
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holding the value of the rest constant at their mean values. Dummy variables vary from 0 to 1 
while the effect of continuous variables is measured by altering their value by one standard 
deviation from the mean value.    
Overall, all independent variables held at their average values, the probability of a tender offer 
succeeding is almost 92%. Hostility and multiple bidders have a huge negative effect on the 
probability of success. The effect of hostility ranges from 37% to 60% while competition 
decreases the probability of success at least by 18%. Compared to the effect of these two 
variables, the impact and economic significance of most other independent variables is 
diminutive.  
Termination fees can be observed to have a major positive impact on the probability of success 
while the same effect is experienced with having a toehold in hostile offer situations. The high 
positive effect of termination fees arises a question that why those are not used practically at all 
outside the United States.       
The analysis on the effect of single variables in hostile and competed offers reinforces the earlier 
observation that an increase in the tender offer premium is most helpful in overcoming 
management resistance and beating competition. A one standard deviation increase in the 
premium increases the probability of success by 8.8% in hostile offers and by 7.7% in multiple 
bidder situations. In the full sample the effect of a similar increase is only 1.9%. In hostile and 
competed offers the marginal effect of the size of the premium is higher than effect of offer price 
exceeding the 52-week high price of the target (Premium > 52-week high). Generally, the offer 
price exceeding the 52-week high price improves the probability of success by 2.5%. Baker et al. 
(2009) find the increase to be between 3% and 4%.   
The negative effect of one standard deviation change in the target country creditor protection 
varies from 1.5% to 1.7%. The modest effect is reasonable, as powerful the creditors might be 
their influence over corporate decisions and especially in tender offers should be quite limited. 
The last point to highlight is the small effect of any independent variable besides target 
management attitude in single-bidder offers. It certainly proves the remarkable influence of the 
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incumbent management over all company matters, even those at which they should play no part 
at all.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probability of Success 0.918 0.458 0.616 0.954 0.939 0.913 0.375 0.663 0.949 0.953
Variables
Target attitude -0.368 -0.417 -0.358 -0.376 -0.409 -0.500 -0.387 -0.596
Competition -0.242 -0.300 -0.232 -0.182 -0.281 -0.191
Premium 1 week 0.019 0.058 0.077 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.030 0.034 0.008 0.010
% of cash 0.009 0.015 0.041 0.004 0.004 0.169 0.007 0.080 0.009 0.002
Toehold 0.002 0.075 0.023 -0.001 0.004 0.0051 0.103 0.048 0.001 0.011
Termination 0.071 0.448 0.226 0.041 0.027 0.129 0.664 0.315 0.095 0.043
Premium > 52w high 0.025 0.014 0.013 0.021 0.032
Investor protection
Target: Creditor -0.015 -0.017
Control variables
Cross-border 0.017 0.050 0.009 0.015 0.019 -0.006 0.010 0.015
Cross-industry -0.017 -0.050 -0.022 -0.016 -0.002 -0.032 -0.031 -0.076 -0.027 -0.025
Statistics
Observations 3783 550 694 3083 1403 1845 280 341 1495 580
Full Sample Sample with 52w high
Models
Table 15: Marginal effect of significant variables to success probability 
This table presents the probability of success and the marginal effects of individual, significant variables to the probability of tender offer being successful in 
different types of situations. Model 1 presents the effects with the base models while model 2 present results for regressions for hostile offers. Models 3 and 4 
do the same for multiple and single bidder situations. Model 5 presents the effects in cross-border offers. The models used are the full developed regression 
models for which the results are reported earlier. Only marginal effects of the significant variables are reported. The change in probability for dummy variables 
(Target, attitude, Competition, Termination, Premium > 52w high, Cross-Border and Cross-Industry) represent the marginal effect of the particular 
independent varying from 0 to 1. The change in probability for continuous variables (Premium 1 week, % of cash, Toehold, Target: Creditor) represent the 
marginal effect of the particular independent variable varying by one standard deviation. The marginal effects are calculated by changing the value of one 
variable while holding the other independent variables constant at their mean values.      
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6 CONCLUSION 
This section summarizes and discusses the empirical results of the study, presents ideas for 
further study and concludes this thesis. 
6.1 Summary and Discussion of the Empirical Results 
The purpose and objective of this thesis was to examine the determinants significantly affecting 
the outcome of a tender offer and investigate the role of differing investor protection in cross-
border tender offers. The sample consisted of 3783 tender offers spanning from 1986 to 2010. 
The targets were from 38 countries across the globe. However, despite the relatively high number 
of countries included in the sample, country level comparisons were left a bit short as the final 
sample was highly concentrated towards tender offers conducted in the United States, United 
Kingdom and other countries which have adopted the English common law system.   
Tender offers are found to be a takeover mechanism typical especially for countries which have 
adopted English common law as their legal system. 80 % of all offers are conducted in these 
countries. These countries include the United States and the United Kingdom which are 
considered to have the most sophisticated capital markets in the world. The result is baffling 
when taking into account that the French civil law is the most wide-spread system among the 
countries in my sample but less than 300 tender offers are made for targets in French civil law 
countries. This hints about the cultural differences between countries and the effect of those 
differences in deciding the proper method for corporate acquisitions. I suspect that private 
negotiations are strongly favored in countries other than the UK or the UK as a transfer 
mechanism of corporate control.  
The first objective of this thesis was to find the generally significant determinants affecting the 
outcome of tender offers. Table 16 provides a summary of the empirical results discovered in this 
thesis. First, the attitude of the target management and competition among bidders are found to 
be the most significant determinants of tender offer success. Both are negative and highly 
significant at 1 % level in every model studied in this thesis. The negative effect of hostility to 
the outcome of an offer ranges from 37% to 60% while competition among bidders decreases the 
probability of a single offer succeeding at least by 18%. Compared to the effect of these two 
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variables, the impact and economic significance of most other independent variables is 
diminutive.  
Table 16: Summary of the empirical results 
This table presents the summary of the expected and the realized empirical results. A few additional notes to the 
results: 1. Toehold is found to be significant and has a positive effect on the outcome of the offer, but only in the case 
when the offer is hostile. 2. Termination fees are mainly observed with US based targets and bidders and the use of 
termination fees is found affecting the outcome positively only with US based targets.     
 
This confirms the results of previous studies (Pelligrino, 1972; Ebeid, 1974; Hoffmeister and Dyl, 
1981; Walkling, 1985, Hirsleifer and Titman, 1990; Holl and Kyriazis, 1996; Flanagan et al. 
1998; Elsland and Weber, 2006; Baker et al. 2009) which also found the target management 
resistance to be the foremost reason for a tender offer failing. The reason for resistance is found 
to be two-fold; it can be due to strategic bargaining in order to increase the price offered or the 
result of managerial entrenchment (Schwert, 2000). I find the offer premium being significant 
and positive in hostile offers which implicates that hostility is used as a negotiation tactic. The 
Hypothesis Sign
H1
The size of the tender offer premium increases the 
probability of success.
+
H2
Tender offer premium higher than the target 52-
week high price increases the probability of 
success.  
+
H3
Target management resistance decreases the 
probability of success.
-
H4
The size of the toehold held by the bidder in the 
target increases the probability of success.
+
H5
Competition among bidders decreases the 
probability of success.
-
H6
The proportion of cash used as the method of 
payment increases  the probability of success.
+
H7
The size of the target firm decreases the probability 
of success.
+/-
H8
Inclusion of a termination fee increases the 
probability of success.
+
H9
Difference in the level of investor protection 
between target and acquirer countries decreases 
the probability of success.
-
Significant
Significant
Not significant
Significant
2
Not significant
Result
Significant
Significant
Significant
Significant
1
-
Expected sign
+
+
-
+
-
+
-
+
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negative effect of competition among bidders has also been found significant previously by 
Flanagan et al. (1998). 
Like the theoretical model of Hirsleifer and Titman (1990) predicts I find the one week offer 
premium to be a significant predictor of the outcome of a tender offer. This also confirms the 
empirical results of Walkling (1985). The effect is positive, so a higher premium improves the 
probability of success. Observing hostile and competed bids also confirms the role of a higher 
premium in improving the probability of success. The positive effect of the premium is less 
significant in non-hostile and single-bidder situations. There is however variation in the 
significance and even in the effect on the premium when examining different countries and 
country groups. The premium is not significant in cross-border offers when the overall level of 
premiums offered is already high. 
To better understand the ambiguity around the significance of the tender offer premium I 
included a variable whether the offer price exceeds the past 52-week high price of the target as a 
psychological reference point, which has been proven meaningful by Baker et al. (2009). When 
this variable was included the significance of the one week premium faded while the new 
variable was found to be highly significant and have a positive effect on the outcome of the offer. 
This confirms that after exceeding a certain level the significance of the premium is low. The 
result from cross-border offers ratifies this conclusion as when the overall premium level is high 
the one week premium is not significant while the offer price over 52-week high variable is. I 
also found the offer price exceeding the 52-week high to have a positive effect on the outcome in 
single-bidder situations when the target shareholders cannot compare competing bids but have to 
evaluate the relative level of the offer against some other benchmark. 
Cash is definitely the favored method of payment in tender offers. On average 82.1% of the total 
consideration is paid in cash. The higher the level of cash used also increases the probability of 
success significantly. The explanation is simple as using cash signals a high valuation of the 
target and deters competition (Fishman, 1989) and there is no valuation considerations involved 
when using cash. A cash offer is easy to evaluate even by a layperson and there is no fear of 
receiving overvalued stock in return (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).      
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Toeholds have been found consistently to have a positive effect on the tender offer outcome 
(Hirsleifer and Titman, 1990; Walkling, 1985; Holl and Kyriazis, 1996; Flanagan et al., 1998; 
Elsland & Weber, 2006). I make a slightly contrary finding and confirm that toehold is a 
significant determinant and has a positive effect on the tender offer outcome but only in hostile 
offers. The country level examination reveals that toehold is somewhat significant generally in 
the US and UK but significance and the negative sign in other English common law countries tips 
the scale to assume that toeholds are mainly associated with hostile offers (Betton et al., 2009). 
Contrary to toeholds, I find that termination fees are mainly used in friendly offers. The use of 
termination fees also limits heavily to US based targets and bidders. The inclusion of a 
termination fee has a significant positive effect on the outcome of the offer but it only holds in 
the sample consisting of US based targets. In some samples the sign is negative, so the inclusion 
of a termination fee can be interpreted as a sign of distrust between the parties in countries 
belonging to English or French legal system. The use of termination fees is almost inexistent in 
Japan and other countries belonging to the German and Scandinavian legal groups. The use of 
termination fees has been investigated previously only by Flanagan et al. (1998) who also found 
the inclusion of termination fee increase the probability of success with US targets. The target 
size is found to be insignificant determinant of success and even the sign varies in different 
samples.  
Out of the control variables cross-industry status seems to significantly decrease the probability 
of success. Cross-border status seems to increase the probability of success in some samples. The 
credible explanation for these effects lies in the size of the premium. Cross-border deals are 
associated with generally higher premiums than average offers which increases the probability of 
success. The opposite holds for cross-industry deals. The bidder might lack industry expertise in 
the target industry and make an offer which does not fully reflect the value of the target.  
The role of investor protection  
The second objective of this thesis was to examine cross-border offers and evaluate the effect of 
investor protection differences in target and bidder countries to the outcome of tender offers. 
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First, I used an approach presented by Bris and Cabolis (2008a) and Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008) and test the effect of corporate governance transfer to the outcome of tender offers. The 
idea is to see whether an improvement or deterioration in investor protection due to the 
acquisition has any effects to the potential outcome of the offer. The before mentioned authors 
have found positive abnormal returns relating to these kind of cross-border acquisitions and 
associated the returns with the resulting improved monitoring and governance of the target 
company and its management. I do not find any evidence of these differences being significant 
determinants of tender offer outcome. Corporate governance transfer does not explain the success 
or failure of tender offers. 
However, when I test the investor protection variables for the target and the bidder individually I 
find a bit surprising results. Shareholder protection is found to be insignificant as a determinant 
of tender offer outcome. However, as shareholders vote with their wallets in tender offers the 
result makes sense. All that is required is that the ownership of the individual shareholders is 
recognized. This adds to the line of results published by Spamann (2010) who revises the anti-
director rights index constructed originally by La Porta et al. (1998). Spamann discards many 
previous results with the corrected index and I can add that shareholder protection does not 
explain the outcome of tender offers either. 
But I find consistent evidence that the level of target shareholder protection has a significant, 
negative effect on the outcome of a tender offer. The reason for this lies in the risk-averse nature 
of creditors. Companies based in countries with a high level investor protection follow less risky 
operating and investment strategies (Acharya et al. 2009). Creditors are also more influential in 
these countries. In countries with higher creditor protection the relative size of the private credit 
sector, measured by the proportion of private credit to GDP, is larger, and thus, it is more 
influential (Djankov et al, 2007).  An acquisition by an outside bidder could aim to create value 
by increasing the riskiness of the target company’s operations which would make its cash flows 
also more volatile. That poses a threat to target creditors, so they react negatively. This kind of 
setting can be seen as an asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in which the 
creditors resist the change of control over the target assets as a change in control would increase 
the riskiness of the target assets. The negative effect on the outcome is due to creditors using their 
influence over the target management to resist the bid.                   
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6.2 Suggestions for Further Studies 
Plenty of areas still remain which could be examined further in the research of tender offers and 
their success. Although I employed a relatively diverse dataset I was unable to conduct proper 
country-level comparisons due to lack of country-level data. This could be done with a more 
balanced dataset. 
Target management attitude seems to be the most crucial factor affecting the outcome of a tender 
offer. It is interesting as the offer should be directed towards shareholders and not for the 
management. Hostility has been quite well studies especially with US based companies, but I 
would find it interesting to add factors such as ownership structure of the company, management 
and board ownership and other variables relating to the management of the target company to see 
whether these affect the outcome and the explanatory power of hostility. 
As the higher creditor protection was found to have a negative effect on the outcome offer and 
the consequence of value creation by asset substitution by the potential buyer. This could be 
studied further by examining cross-border tender offers and the operating characteristics of the 
target firms before and after the offer to see whether the riskiness of operating strategies actually 
increases. 
The corporate governance variables I added in this thesis are closely connected to cultural 
differences, so my last suggestion for further research would be to add variables describing 
cultural differences to see whether they have an effect on the takeover process and the outcome 
of the offer.   
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